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src/content/browser/isolated_origin_browsertest.cc
W. James MacLean d8d31f0fae Allow trailing dot in host while checking valid origins for opt-in/out. 
Prior to this CL, any origin with a trailing dot in the host name would
fail the origin-validity check in ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::
AddOriginIsolationStateForBrowsingInstance() during attempts to
opt-in or out of origin isolation.

This CL corrects this, and adds a test.

Bug: 1446661
Change-Id: Iba17968adcb7d3c3af24b605f662318f5c5dc25b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/4544436
Commit-Queue: James Maclean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1149853}
2023-05-26 19:15:57 +00:00

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// Copyright 2017 The Chromium Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include <sstream>
#include <tuple>
#include <vector>
#include "base/command_line.h"
#include "base/functional/bind.h"
#include "base/memory/raw_ptr.h"
#include "base/memory/raw_ref.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
#include "base/test/bind.h"
#include "base/test/metrics/histogram_tester.h"
#include "base/test/scoped_feature_list.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "content/browser/bad_message.h"
#include "content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/origin_agent_cluster_isolation_state.h"
#include "content/browser/process_lock.h"
#include "content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.h"
#include "content/browser/renderer_host/navigator.h"
#include "content/browser/renderer_host/render_process_host_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/site_info.h"
#include "content/browser/storage_partition_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.h"
#include "content/common/content_navigation_policy.h"
#include "content/common/features.h"
#include "content/public/browser/browser_or_resource_context.h"
#include "content/public/browser/render_frame_host.h"
#include "content/public/browser/render_process_host.h"
#include "content/public/browser/site_isolation_policy.h"
#include "content/public/browser/storage_partition_config.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_features.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
#include "content/public/test/back_forward_cache_util.h"
#include "content/public/test/browser_test.h"
#include "content/public/test/browser_test_utils.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_browser_test.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_browser_test_utils.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_mock_cert_verifier.h"
#include "content/public/test/navigation_handle_observer.h"
#include "content/public/test/prerender_test_util.h"
#include "content/public/test/test_frame_navigation_observer.h"
#include "content/public/test/test_navigation_observer.h"
#include "content/public/test/test_utils.h"
#include "content/public/test/url_loader_interceptor.h"
#include "content/shell/browser/shell.h"
#include "content/test/content_browser_test_utils_internal.h"
#include "content/test/did_commit_navigation_interceptor.h"
#include "mojo/public/cpp/bindings/pending_receiver.h"
#include "mojo/public/cpp/bindings/receiver_set.h"
#include "net/dns/mock_host_resolver.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/embedded_test_server.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/http_request.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/http_response.h"
#include "services/network/public/cpp/features.h"
#include "testing/gmock/include/gmock/gmock.h"
#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
#include "third_party/blink/public/common/features.h"
#include "third_party/blink/public/common/storage_key/storage_key.h"
#include "third_party/blink/public/common/tokens/tokens.h"
#include "third_party/blink/public/mojom/dom_storage/dom_storage.mojom-test-utils.h"
#include "url/gurl.h"
namespace content {
using IsolatedOriginSource = ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::IsolatedOriginSource;
// This is a base class for all tests in this class. It does not isolate any
// origins and only provides common helper functions to the other test classes.
class IsolatedOriginTestBase : public ContentBrowserTest {
public:
IsolatedOriginTestBase() = default;
~IsolatedOriginTestBase() override = default;
IsolatedOriginTestBase(const IsolatedOriginTestBase&) = delete;
IsolatedOriginTestBase& operator=(const IsolatedOriginTestBase&) = delete;
// Check if `origin` is an isolated origin. This helper is used in tests
// that care only about globally applicable isolated origins (not restricted
// to a particular BrowsingInstance or profile).
bool IsIsolatedOrigin(const url::Origin& origin) {
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
IsolationContext isolation_context(
shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext());
return policy->IsIsolatedOrigin(isolation_context, origin,
false /* origin_requests_isolation */);
}
bool IsIsolatedOrigin(const GURL& url) {
return IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url));
}
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState MakeOACIsolationState(
bool requires_origin_keyed_process) {
// Assume |requires_origin_keyed_process| is the same as
// |is_origin_agent_cluster| here.
if (!requires_origin_keyed_process) {
return OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateNonIsolated();
}
return OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateForOriginAgentCluster(
requires_origin_keyed_process);
}
bool ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(const url::Origin& origin) {
auto* site_instance = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState isolation_request =
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateNonIsolated();
return ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
site_instance->GetIsolationContext(), origin, isolation_request)
.requires_origin_keyed_process();
}
// Assuming no additional explicit opt-in or opt-out was requested, check what
// isolation state would currently be used for a navigation to |url| in
// |site_instance| in the test, based on the current state in the
// BrowsingInstance.
static OriginAgentClusterIsolationState DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance,
const GURL& url) {
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState isolation_request =
site_instance->GetIsolationContext().default_isolation_state();
return ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
site_instance->GetIsolationContext(), url::Origin::Create(url),
isolation_request);
}
ProcessLock ProcessLockFromUrl(const std::string& url) {
BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
return ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(SiteInfo(
GURL(url), GURL(url),
/*requires_origin_keyed_process=*/false,
/*requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default=*/false,
/*is_sandboxed=*/false, UrlInfo::kInvalidUniqueSandboxId,
StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(browser_context),
WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated(), /*is_guest=*/false,
/*does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop=*/false,
/*is_jit_disabled=*/false, /*is_pdf=*/false,
/*is_fenced=*/false));
}
WebContentsImpl* web_contents() const {
return static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell()->web_contents());
}
// Helper function that computes an appropriate process lock that corresponds
// to `url`'s origin (without converting to sites, handling effective URLs,
// etc). This must be equivalent to what
// SiteInstanceImpl::DetermineProcessLockURL() would return
// for strict origin isolation.
// Note: do not use this for opt-in origin isolation, as it won't set
// requires_origin_keyed_process to true.
ProcessLock GetStrictProcessLock(const GURL& url) {
BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
GURL origin_url = url::Origin::Create(url).GetURL();
return ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(SiteInfo(
origin_url, origin_url,
/*requires_origin_keyed_process=*/false,
/*requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default=*/false,
/*is_sandboxed=*/false, UrlInfo::kInvalidUniqueSandboxId,
StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(browser_context),
WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated(), /*is_guest=*/false,
/*does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop=*/false,
/*is_jit_disabled=*/false, /*is_pdf=*/false,
/*is_fenced=*/false));
}
protected:
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
ContentBrowserTest::SetUpOnMainThread();
mock_cert_verifier_.mock_cert_verifier()->set_default_result(net::OK);
}
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
ContentBrowserTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
mock_cert_verifier_.SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
}
void SetUpInProcessBrowserTestFixture() override {
ContentBrowserTest::SetUpInProcessBrowserTestFixture();
mock_cert_verifier_.SetUpInProcessBrowserTestFixture();
}
void TearDownInProcessBrowserTestFixture() override {
ContentBrowserTest::TearDownInProcessBrowserTestFixture();
mock_cert_verifier_.TearDownInProcessBrowserTestFixture();
}
private:
content::ContentMockCertVerifier mock_cert_verifier_;
};
class IsolatedOriginTest : public IsolatedOriginTestBase {
public:
IsolatedOriginTest() = default;
~IsolatedOriginTest() override = default;
IsolatedOriginTest(const IsolatedOriginTest&) = delete;
IsolatedOriginTest& operator=(const IsolatedOriginTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen());
std::string origin_list =
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/").spec() + "," +
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/").spec();
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kIsolateOrigins, origin_list);
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::SetUpOnMainThread();
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
embedded_test_server()->StartAcceptingConnections();
}
void InjectAndClickLinkTo(GURL url) {
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(web_contents(),
"var link = document.createElement('a');"
"link.href = '" +
url.spec() +
"';"
"document.body.appendChild(link);"
"link.click();"));
}
};
// Tests that verify the header can be used to opt-in to origin isolation.
class OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest : public IsolatedOriginTestBase {
public:
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest()
: https_server_(net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS) {
feature_list_.InitWithFeatures(
{features::kOriginIsolationHeader},
{blink::features::kOriginAgentClusterDefaultEnabled});
}
~OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest() override = default;
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest(const OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest&) =
delete;
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest& operator=(
const OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen());
// This is needed for this test to run properly on platforms where
// --site-per-process isn't the default, such as Android.
IsolateAllSitesForTesting(command_line);
// Start the HTTPS server here so derived tests can use it if they override
// SetUpCommandLine().
https_server()->AddDefaultHandlers(GetTestDataFilePath());
https_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(
base::BindRepeating(&OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest::HandleResponse,
base::Unretained(this)));
ASSERT_TRUE(https_server()->Start());
}
void SetHeaderValue(const std::string& header_value) {
header_ = header_value;
}
void SetRedirectTarget(const std::string& redirect_target) {
redirect_target_ = redirect_target;
}
// Allows specifying what content to return when an opt-in isolation header is
// intercepted. Uses a queue so that multiple requests can be handled without
// returning to the test body. If the queue is empty, the document content is
// simply "isolate me!".
void AddContentToQueue(const std::string& content_str) {
content_.push(content_str);
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::SetUpOnMainThread();
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
embedded_test_server()->StartAcceptingConnections();
}
void TearDownOnMainThread() override {
ASSERT_TRUE(https_server()->ShutdownAndWaitUntilComplete());
IsolatedOriginTestBase::TearDownOnMainThread();
}
// Need an https server because the header requires HTTPS.
net::EmbeddedTestServer* https_server() { return &https_server_; }
private:
std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> HandleResponse(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
if (request.relative_url == "/isolate_origin") {
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_code(net::HTTP_OK);
response->set_content_type("text/html");
if (header_) {
response->AddCustomHeader("Origin-Agent-Cluster", *header_);
}
if (!content_.empty()) {
response->set_content(content_.front());
content_.pop();
} else {
response->set_content("isolate me!");
}
return std::move(response);
} else if (request.relative_url == "/redirect_me") {
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_code(net::HTTP_MOVED_PERMANENTLY);
response->AddCustomHeader("Location", *redirect_target_);
response->AddCustomHeader("Origin-Agent-Cluster", *header_);
response->set_content("redirected");
return std::move(response);
}
// If we return nullptr, then the server will go ahead and actually serve
// the file.
return nullptr;
}
net::EmbeddedTestServer https_server_;
base::test::ScopedFeatureList feature_list_;
absl::optional<std::string> header_;
absl::optional<std::string> redirect_target_;
std::queue<std::string> content_;
};
// A set of tests that enable OriginAgentCluster by default.
class OriginIsolationDefaultOACTest : public OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest {
public:
OriginIsolationDefaultOACTest() {
feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
blink::features::kOriginAgentClusterDefaultEnabled);
}
~OriginIsolationDefaultOACTest() override = default;
OriginIsolationDefaultOACTest(const OriginIsolationDefaultOACTest&) = delete;
OriginIsolationDefaultOACTest& operator=(OriginIsolationDefaultOACTest&) =
delete;
private:
base::test::ScopedFeatureList feature_list_;
};
// A set of tests that enable process-isolated OriginAgentCluster-by-default.
class OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest : public OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest {
public:
OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest() {
feature_list_.InitWithFeatures(
{blink::features::kOriginAgentClusterDefaultEnabled,
features::kOriginKeyedProcessesByDefault},
{});
}
~OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest() override = default;
OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest(const OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest&) =
delete;
OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest& operator=(OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest&) =
delete;
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest::SetUpOnMainThread();
// Constructing a new BrowserClient also installs it; the old BrowserClient
// is restored when the new one destructs.
browser_client_ =
std::make_unique<OriginAgentClusterByDefaultContentBrowserClient>();
}
protected:
// A custom ContentBrowserClient to allow tests to simulate turning off
// OriginAgentClusterByDefault.
class OriginAgentClusterByDefaultContentBrowserClient
: public ContentBrowserTestContentBrowserClient {
public:
bool ShouldDisableOriginAgentClusterDefault(
BrowserContext* browser_context) override {
return should_disable_origin_agent_cluster_default_;
}
void SetShouldDisableOriginAgentClusterDefault(bool should_disable) {
should_disable_origin_agent_cluster_default_ = should_disable;
}
private:
bool should_disable_origin_agent_cluster_default_ = false;
};
std::unique_ptr<OriginAgentClusterByDefaultContentBrowserClient>
browser_client_;
private:
base::test::ScopedFeatureList feature_list_;
};
class OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest
: public OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest {
public:
OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest()
: prerender_helper_(base::BindRepeating(
&OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest::prerender_web_contents,
base::Unretained(this))) {}
~OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest() override = default;
OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest(
const OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest&) = delete;
OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest& operator=(
const OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
// This must be called prior to starting the test server.
prerender_helper_.SetUp(https_server());
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
}
void set_prerender_web_contents(WebContents* web_contents) {
prerender_web_contents_ = web_contents;
}
WebContents* prerender_web_contents() { return prerender_web_contents_; }
protected:
test::PrerenderTestHelper prerender_helper_;
private:
raw_ptr<WebContents, DanglingUntriaged> prerender_web_contents_;
}; // class OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest
// As in OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest, but with same-process origin
// isolation.
class SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest
: public OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest {
public:
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest() = default;
~SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest() override = default;
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest(
const SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest&) = delete;
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest& operator=(
const SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
command_line->RemoveSwitch(switches::kSitePerProcess);
}
};
// As in SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest, but command-line isolate
// foo.com.
class SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderWithIsolatedOriginTest
: public SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest {
public:
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderWithIsolatedOriginTest() = default;
~SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderWithIsolatedOriginTest() override =
default;
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderWithIsolatedOriginTest(
const SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderWithIsolatedOriginTest&) =
delete;
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderWithIsolatedOriginTest& operator=(
const SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderWithIsolatedOriginTest&) =
delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kIsolateOrigins,
"https://foo.com/");
}
};
// Force WebSecurity off for tests.
class SameProcessNoWebSecurityOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest
: public SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest {
public:
SameProcessNoWebSecurityOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest() = default;
~SameProcessNoWebSecurityOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest() override = default;
// Disallow copy & assign.
SameProcessNoWebSecurityOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest(
const SameProcessNoWebSecurityOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest&) = delete;
SameProcessNoWebSecurityOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest& operator=(
const SameProcessNoWebSecurityOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableWebSecurity);
}
};
// Used for a few tests that check non-HTTPS secure context behavior.
class OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest : public IsolatedOriginTestBase {
public:
OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest() = default;
OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest(
const OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest&) = delete;
OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest& operator=(
const OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen());
// This is needed for this test to run properly on platforms where
// --site-per-process isn't the default, such as Android.
IsolateAllSitesForTesting(command_line);
feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(features::kOriginIsolationHeader);
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(base::BindRepeating(
&OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest::HandleResponse,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
embedded_test_server()->StartAcceptingConnections();
}
private:
std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> HandleResponse(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_code(net::HTTP_OK);
response->set_content_type("text/html");
response->AddCustomHeader("Origin-Agent-Cluster", "?1");
response->set_content("isolate me!");
return std::move(response);
}
base::test::ScopedFeatureList feature_list_;
};
// This class allows testing the interaction of OptIn isolation and command-line
// isolation for origins. Tests using this class will isolate foo.com and
// bar.com by default using command-line isolation, but any opt-in isolation
// will override this.
class OriginIsolationOptInHeaderCommandLineTest
: public OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest {
public:
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderCommandLineTest() = default;
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderCommandLineTest(
const OriginIsolationOptInHeaderCommandLineTest&) = delete;
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderCommandLineTest& operator=(
const OriginIsolationOptInHeaderCommandLineTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
// The base class should already have started the HTTPS server so we can use
// it here to generate origins to specify on the command line.
ASSERT_TRUE(https_server()->Started());
std::string origin_list = https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/").spec() +
"," +
https_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/").spec();
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kIsolateOrigins, origin_list);
}
};
// This test verifies that opt-in isolation takes precedence over command-line
// isolation. It loads an opt-in isolated base origin (which would have
// otherwise been isolated via command-line isolation), and then loads a child
// frame sub-origin which should-not be isolated (but would have been if the
// base origin was command-line isolated).
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderCommandLineTest,
OptInOverridesCommandLine) {
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Start off with an isolated base-origin in an a(a) configuration, then
// navigate the subframe to a sub-origin not requesting isolation.
// Note: this works because we serve mock headers with the base origin's html
// file, which set the header.
GURL isolated_base_origin_url(https_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/isolated_base_origin_with_subframe.html"));
GURL non_isolated_sub_origin(
https_server()->GetURL("non_isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_base_origin_url));
// The .html main frame has two iframes, this test only uses the first one.
EXPECT_EQ(3u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, non_isolated_sub_origin));
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_base_origin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Make sure the child (i.e. sub-origin) is not isolated.
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(
GURL("https://foo.com"),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
// The following test passes because IsIsolatedOrigin doesn't distinguish
// between command-line isolation and opt-in isolation.
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->IsIsolatedOrigin(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin),
false /* origin_requests_isolation */));
// Make sure the opt-in isolated origin is origin-keyed, and the non-opt-in
// origin is site-keyed.
EXPECT_TRUE(root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_frame_node->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Make sure the master opt-in list has the base origin isolated and the sub
// origin not isolated.
BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
browser_context, url::Origin::Create(isolated_base_origin_url)));
EXPECT_FALSE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
browser_context, url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin)));
}
// A test to verify that an origin with a trailing dot in the domain name
// doesn't crash when it opts-out of origin isolation when
// kOriginAgentClusterDefaultEnabled is enabled.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
TrailingDotDomainOptOutDoesNotCrash) {
GURL dotted_nonisolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("a.com.", "/isolate_origin"));
// Set header to opt this domain out of default OriginAgentCluster.
SetHeaderValue("?0");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), dotted_nonisolated_url));
url::Origin origin(url::Origin::Create(dotted_nonisolated_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
}
// A test to confirm that "a.com." is treated as a separate host (and hence
// a separate origin) from "a.com". See example at
// https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-domain.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
TrailingDotDomainIsolatesSeparately1) {
GURL main_frame_url(https_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(foo.com,foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_url(https_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/isolate_origin"));
GURL dotted_isolated_url(https_server()->GetURL("a.com.", "/isolate_origin"));
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Create page with sibling iframes.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), main_frame_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
EXPECT_EQ(2u, root->child_count());
FrameTreeNode* child0_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child1_frame_node = root->child_at(1);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child0_frame_node, isolated_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child1_frame_node, dotted_isolated_url));
url::Origin child0_origin(url::Origin::Create(isolated_url));
url::Origin child1_origin(url::Origin::Create(dotted_isolated_url));
EXPECT_NE(isolated_url, dotted_isolated_url);
EXPECT_NE(child0_origin, child1_origin);
EXPECT_TRUE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(child0_origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(child1_origin));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> child0_site_instance =
child0_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> child1_site_instance =
child1_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(child0_site_instance, child1_site_instance);
EXPECT_NE(child0_site_instance->GetProcess(),
child1_site_instance->GetProcess());
}
// A test similar to TrailingDotDomainIsolatesSeparately1, but this time the
// "a.com" domain does not opt-in via a header, and does not get an origin-
// keyed process. Thus, it ends up in a separate process from "a.com.".
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
TrailingDotDomainIsolatesSeparately2) {
GURL main_frame_url(https_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(foo.com,foo.com)"));
GURL non_isolated_url(https_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL dotted_isolated_url(https_server()->GetURL("a.com.", "/isolate_origin"));
// Create page with sibling iframes.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), main_frame_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
EXPECT_EQ(2u, root->child_count());
FrameTreeNode* child0_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child1_frame_node = root->child_at(1);
SetHeaderValue("?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child0_frame_node, dotted_isolated_url));
SetHeaderValue("");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child1_frame_node, non_isolated_url));
url::Origin child0_origin(url::Origin::Create(dotted_isolated_url));
url::Origin child1_origin(url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(child0_origin));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(child1_origin));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> child0_site_instance =
child0_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> child1_site_instance =
child1_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(child0_site_instance, child1_site_instance);
EXPECT_NE(child0_site_instance->GetProcess(),
child1_site_instance->GetProcess());
}
// A test to confirm that if an Origin-Agent-Cluster header is encountered (but
// not committed) as part of a redirect, that it does not opt-in to
// OriginAgentCluster isolation. The setup in this test is subtle, since in
// order for the call to NavigationRequest::OnRequestRedirected() to attempt to
// create a new SiteInstance, we must load the same origin the redirect wants to
// use, and load it without OriginAgentCluster isolation. Prior to the fix for
// https://crbug.com/1329061 the redirect would result in opting the origin into
// OriginAgentCluster isolation since no global walk is present to detect that
// it has already been loaded without.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
RedirectSameSiteWithOACDoesntOptIn) {
GURL main_frame_url(https_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL redirect_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/redirect_me"));
GURL expected_commit_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
url::Origin origin(url::Origin::Create(main_frame_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), main_frame_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
SetRedirectTarget("/title1.html");
SetHeaderValue("?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, redirect_url,
expected_commit_url));
// This next line verifies that the OriginAgentCluster header sent with the
// 301 redirect failed to opt foo.com into OriginAgentCluster isolation, as
// it should. The check will fail if the origin was opted-in to
// OriginAgentCluster isolation.
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
}
// Same as the preceding test, but the redirect is cross-site.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
RedirectCrossSiteWithOACDoesntOptIn) {
GURL main_frame_url(https_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL redirect_url(https_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/redirect_me"));
GURL expected_commit_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
url::Origin origin(url::Origin::Create(main_frame_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), main_frame_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
SetRedirectTarget(expected_commit_url.spec());
SetHeaderValue("?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, redirect_url,
expected_commit_url));
// This next line verifies that the OriginAgentCluster header sent with the
// 301 redirect failed to opt foo.com into OriginAgentCluster isolation, as
// it should. The check will fail if the origin was opted-in to
// OriginAgentCluster isolation.
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
}
// This tests that header-based opt-in causes the origin to end up in the
// isolated origins list.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest, Basic) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL url(https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
url::Origin origin(url::Origin::Create(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kRequestedAndOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
// A test to ensure that origins whose host has a trailing dot pass the
// validation checks for explicit opt-ins and opt-outs. This is an
// `OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest` test in order that the explicit opt-out
// will be tracked. Note: failure for either part of this test will involve
// crashing on a CHECK in
// ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddOriginIsolationStateForBrowsingInstance():
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest,
HostWithTrailingDotAllowed) {
// Explicit opt-in with a trailing dot.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL opt_in_url(https_server()->GetURL("opt-in.foo.com.", "/isolate_origin"));
url::Origin opt_in_origin(url::Origin::Create(opt_in_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(opt_in_origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), opt_in_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(opt_in_origin));
// Explicit opt-out with a trailing dot.
SetHeaderValue("?0");
GURL opt_out_url(
https_server()->GetURL("opt-out.foo.com.", "/isolate_origin"));
url::Origin opt_out_origin(url::Origin::Create(opt_out_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(opt_out_origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), opt_out_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(opt_out_origin));
}
// A simple test that, when OAC-by-default is enabled with process-isolation, an
// origin that receives default OAC is put in an origin-keyed process.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest,
DefaultIsOriginKeyedProcess) {
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> site_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState isolation_state =
DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(site_instance.get(), test_url);
// Even though this request has no OriginAgentCluster header, it should get
// an origin-keyed process by default.
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(site_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(
site_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default());
}
// The same as for DefaultOptInIsIsolated, but testing on a subframe.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest,
SubframeDefaultIsOriginKeyedProcess) {
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
// Even though this request has no OriginAgentCluster header, it should get
// an origin-keyed process by default.
SetHeaderValue("");
GURL default_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, default_isolated_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> root_site_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> child_site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState child_isolation_state =
DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(child_site_instance.get(),
default_isolated_url);
EXPECT_NE(child_site_instance, root_site_instance);
EXPECT_NE(child_site_instance->GetProcess(),
root_site_instance->GetProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_isolation_state.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_isolation_state.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_EQ(
root_site_instance->GetIsolationContext().default_isolation_state(),
child_site_instance->GetIsolationContext().default_isolation_state());
EXPECT_TRUE(
child_site_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_site_instance->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default());
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
IsolationContext isolation_context =
root_site_instance->GetIsolationContext();
// Verify that we're not explicitly tracking the origin for
// `default_isolated_url`.
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<OriginAgentClusterIsolationState*>(nullptr),
policy->LookupOriginIsolationStateForTesting(
isolation_context.browsing_instance_id(),
url::Origin::Create(default_isolated_url)));
// Now trigger a global walk by attempting to create a non-isolated version of
// the same origin.
GURL attempted_non_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
SetHeaderValue("?0");
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, attempted_non_isolated_url));
// Now the origin should be explicitly tracked, even though it continues to
// have the default isolation state as defined for the current
// BrowsingInstance.
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState* isolation_state2 =
policy->LookupOriginIsolationStateForTesting(
isolation_context.browsing_instance_id(),
url::Origin::Create(default_isolated_url));
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<OriginAgentClusterIsolationState*>(nullptr),
isolation_state2);
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state2->is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state2->requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// Using origin-keyed processes by default faces a challenge for speculative
// RenderFrameHosts, which are created before any OAC headers arrive.
// Note: the origin is tracked even though the SiteInfo still says it is an
// origin-keyed process by default.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest,
ExplicitOptInRespected) {
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
// This request explicitly opts-in to OAC, and should get process isolation.
// Note the use of the "isolate_origin" relative path below to force
// processing of the (non-empty) OAC header.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL explicit_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, explicit_isolated_url));
auto* site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState isolation_state =
DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(site_instance,
explicit_isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(site_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
// In this scenario, the explicit opt-in ends up using a SiteInstance that was
// created for the speculative RFH, and with requires_origin_keyed_process on
// by default. Since we don't want to alter the underlying SiteInfo after
// it's been used to create a ProcessLock, we leave this case as "by_default"
// in the SiteInfo since the isolation behavior is the same.
//
// Note that if the speculative RFH had been created after a previous instance
// of the origin had been explicitly opted-in, then
// `requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default()` would return false in that
// case. This can happen in a cross-origin redirect from A to B, where B has
// an opt-in header. We would create a speculative RFH for A, throw it away
// when the redirect happens, and wait to create the RFH for B until headers
// have arrived.
EXPECT_TRUE(
site_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default());
// Verify the explicit opt-in is being tracked.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
IsolationContext isolation_context =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetIsolationContext();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState* isolation_state2 =
policy->LookupOriginIsolationStateForTesting(
isolation_context.browsing_instance_id(),
url::Origin::Create(explicit_isolated_url));
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<OriginAgentClusterIsolationState*>(nullptr),
isolation_state2);
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state2->is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state2->requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// Process-isolated OAC-by-default should not process isolate a navigation that
// explicitly opts-out. This test is important, in part, for making sure all the
// CanAccessDataForOrigin checks encountered during the navigation pass.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest,
ExplicitOptOutRespected) {
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
// This request explicitly opts-out of OAC, and should not get process
// isolation. Note the use of the "isolate_origin" relative path below to
// force processing of the (non-empty) OAC header.
SetHeaderValue("?0");
GURL default_not_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("not-isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, default_not_isolated_url));
auto* child_site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
// The child should be in a separate process from the main frame despite
// opting-out, because the child is now in a site-keyed process while the
// main frame is in an origin-keyed process (as verified below).
EXPECT_NE(child_site_instance->GetProcess(),
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess());
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState isolation_state =
DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(child_site_instance,
default_not_isolated_url);
EXPECT_FALSE(isolation_state.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_FALSE(isolation_state.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(
child_site_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_site_instance->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default());
// Verify the explicit opt-out is being tracked.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
IsolationContext isolation_context =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetIsolationContext();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState* isolation_state2 =
policy->LookupOriginIsolationStateForTesting(
isolation_context.browsing_instance_id(),
url::Origin::Create(default_not_isolated_url));
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<OriginAgentClusterIsolationState*>(nullptr),
isolation_state2);
EXPECT_FALSE(isolation_state2->is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_FALSE(isolation_state2->requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
namespace {
void TestDefaultIsolationForFrame(
FrameTreeNode* ftn,
const GURL& default_isolated_url,
bool expect_origin_agent_cluster,
bool expect_requires_origin_keyed_process,
bool expect_default_requires_origin_keyed_process) {
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
auto* site_instance = ftn->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState isolation_state =
IsolatedOriginTestBase::DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
site_instance, default_isolated_url);
const SiteInfo& site_info = site_instance->GetSiteInfo();
EXPECT_EQ(expect_origin_agent_cluster,
isolation_state.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_EQ(expect_requires_origin_keyed_process,
isolation_state.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_EQ(expect_requires_origin_keyed_process,
site_info.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_EQ(expect_default_requires_origin_keyed_process,
site_info.requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default());
// Verify that we're not explicitly tracking the origin we isolated by
// default.
IsolationContext isolation_context = site_instance->GetIsolationContext();
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<OriginAgentClusterIsolationState*>(nullptr),
policy->LookupOriginIsolationStateForTesting(
isolation_context.browsing_instance_id(),
url::Origin::Create(default_isolated_url)));
}
} // namespace
// This test verifies that locking the definition of default isolation to
// individual BrowsingInstances works correctly when the underlying feature
// is changed dynamically.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginKeyedProcessByDefaultTest,
DynamicEnterprisePolicyChange) {
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
SetHeaderValue("");
GURL default_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
// Setup first BrowsingInstance. This one will have default isolation with
// origin_agent_cluster and requests_origin_keyed_process (by default) true.
Shell* shell1 = shell();
auto* web_contents1 = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell1->web_contents());
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell1, test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(web_contents1).size());
FrameTreeNode* root1 = web_contents1->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node1 = root1->child_at(0);
// Load a frame into the first BrowsingInstance.
// Even though this request has no OriginAgentCluster header, it should get
// process-isolated OAC by default.
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node1, default_isolated_url));
EXPECT_NE(
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess(),
root1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess());
{
SCOPED_TRACE("child_frame_node1");
TestDefaultIsolationForFrame(
child_frame_node1, default_isolated_url,
/*expect_origin_agent_cluster=*/true,
/*expect_requires_origin_keyed_process=*/true,
/*expect_default_requires_origin_keyed_process=*/true);
}
// Dynamically disable the feature to simulate the enterprise policy being
// dynamically changed.
browser_client_->SetShouldDisableOriginAgentClusterDefault(true);
// Create a second BrowsingInstance. This one will have default isolation with
// origin_agent_cluster = false and requests_origin_keyed_process (by default)
// false.
Shell* shell2 = CreateBrowser();
auto* web_contents2 = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell2->web_contents());
// Load a frame into the second BrowsingInstance.
// This request also has no OriginAgentCluster header, but it should not get
// OAC by default, nor request process-isolation.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell2, test_url));
FrameTreeNode* root2 = web_contents2->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node2 = root2->child_at(0);
// We navigate to `default_isolated_url` again so that we're using the same
// urls in both parts of the test, but we don't expect it to be isolated in
// this BrowsingInstance.
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node2, default_isolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
child_frame_node2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess(),
root2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess());
{
SCOPED_TRACE("child_frame_node2");
TestDefaultIsolationForFrame(
child_frame_node2, default_isolated_url,
/*expect_origin_agent_cluster=*/false,
/*expect_requires_origin_keyed_process=*/false,
/*expect_default_requires_origin_keyed_process=*/false);
}
// We expect the default isolation to be different in the two
// BrowsingInstances.
EXPECT_NE(root1->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext()
.default_isolation_state(),
root2->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext()
.default_isolation_state());
// Another navigation in root1 should respect the origin-keyed default used by
// that BrowsingInstance and not the current site-keyed default.
GURL default_isolated_url2(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell1, test_url));
{
SCOPED_TRACE("root1");
TestDefaultIsolationForFrame(
root1, default_isolated_url2,
/*expect_origin_agent_cluster=*/true,
/*expect_requires_origin_keyed_process=*/true,
/*expect_default_requires_origin_keyed_process=*/true);
}
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationDefaultOACTest, Basic) {
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
// We must load the origins to be isolated (or not) into a child frame so that
// they all stay in the same BrowsingInstance, since the test relies on
// knowing isolation history for the OriginAgentClusterEndResult::*But* cases.
// In this test, the convention is:
// foo.com is (implicitly) isolated,
// isolated.foo.com is (explicitly) isolated,
// isolated.bar.com is (implicitly) isolated, and
// bar.com is (explicitly) not isolated.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
// The first three scenarios should all get the isolation status they request
// (the "And" cases).
{
// Explicitly request OriginAgentCluster via the header.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
base::HistogramTester histograms;
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, isolated_suborigin_url));
auto* site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(site_instance,
isolated_suborigin_url)
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kExplicitlyRequestedAndOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
{
// Even though this request has no OriginAgentCluster header, it should get
// OAC by default.
SetHeaderValue("");
base::HistogramTester histograms;
GURL default_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, default_isolated_url));
auto* site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState isolation_state =
DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(site_instance,
default_isolated_url);
// TODO(wjmaclean): If OriginAgentCluster-by-default transitions to using
// process-isolation at some future date, the second expectation below will
// need to change to EXPECT_TRUE.
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_FALSE(isolation_state.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotExplicitlyRequestedAndOriginKeyed),
1)));
// Ensure that the implicit case did not do a global walk (which would be
// inefficient), by noticing that a hypothetical request for non-isolation
// of that origin in the same SiteInstance would succeed. That can only
// happen if the implicit case was not recorded in the BrowsingInstance.
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState hypothetical_isolation_request =
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateNonIsolated();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState hypothetical_isolation_state =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
site_instance->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(default_isolated_url),
hypothetical_isolation_request);
EXPECT_FALSE(hypothetical_isolation_state.is_origin_agent_cluster());
}
{
// The "isolate_origin" path in the url will force the test framework to
// include the OriginAgentCluster header. Here we explicitly request not to
// have OAC.
SetHeaderValue("?0");
base::HistogramTester histograms;
GURL explicit_non_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, explicit_non_isolated_url));
auto* site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(site_instance,
explicit_non_isolated_url)
.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kExplicitlyNotRequestedAndNotOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
// The next three cases should all fail to get the isolation status they
// request (the "But" cases). In these cases, URLs from origins we have
// already visited in the BrowsingInstance return different OAC header values,
// but are forced to stick with their earlier value rather than the newly
// requested value.
{
// Even though the lack of a header would normally lead to default OAC
// isolation, the previous explicitly non-isolated visit to this origin
// means that this origin will remain not origin keyed.
SetHeaderValue("");
base::HistogramTester histograms;
GURL url(https_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, url));
auto* site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(site_instance, url)
.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotExplicitlyRequestedButNotOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
{
// An explicit opt-out for isolated.bar.com should not be granted given the
// previous default-opt-in above.
SetHeaderValue("?0");
base::HistogramTester histograms;
GURL explicit_non_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, explicit_non_isolated_url));
auto* site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState isolation_state =
DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(site_instance,
explicit_non_isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_state.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_FALSE(isolation_state.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kExplicitlyNotRequestedButOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
{
// Verify that we don't explicitly opt-in an origin that was explicitly
// opted-out.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
base::HistogramTester histograms;
GURL explicit_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, explicit_isolated_url));
auto* site_instance =
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(site_instance,
explicit_isolated_url)
.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kExplicitlyRequestedButNotOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
}
// These tests ensure that non-HTTPS secure contexts (see
// https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy) are
// able to use origin isolation.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest, Localhost) {
GURL url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("localhost", "/"));
url::Origin origin(url::Origin::Create(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest, DotLocalhost) {
GURL url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("test.localhost", "/"));
url::Origin origin(url::Origin::Create(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHttpServerHeaderTest,
OneTwentySeven) {
GURL url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("127.0.0.1", "/"));
url::Origin origin(url::Origin::Create(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
}
// Two tests for basic OAC operation w.r.t. prerendering FrameTrees.
// Basic test to make sure an origin opting-in in a primary FrameTree
// triggers registration of a non-opting-origin in an existing prerendering
// Frametree.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest,
SimplePrerenderSubOriginIsolationTest) {
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
// Navigate primary tab to a non-isolated origin.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
// Create prerender tab, load non-isolated "a.foo.com".
Shell* prerender_tab = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(prerender_tab, GURL(https_server()->GetURL(
"a.foo.com", "/title1.html"))));
auto* prerender_web_contents =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(prerender_tab->web_contents());
set_prerender_web_contents(prerender_web_contents);
GURL non_isolated_origin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("a.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
int host_id = prerender_helper_.AddPrerender(non_isolated_origin_url);
// In primary tab, navigate to an isolated origin.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("a.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_frame_node->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_frame_node->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Verify in prerender tab that "a.foo.com" is registered as a non-isolated
// origin. We must get the SiteInstance() to test from the
// PrerenderedMainFrameHost() to make sure the opt-out registration has
// propagated to the right place.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
auto* prerender_site_instance_impl = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
prerender_helper_.GetPrerenderedMainFrameHost(host_id)
->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
prerender_site_instance_impl->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_origin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Activate the prerendered page and confirm the non-isolated origin remains
// non-isolated.
prerender_helper_.NavigatePrimaryPage(non_isolated_origin_url);
auto* new_prerender_site_instance_impl = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
prerender_tab->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(prerender_site_instance_impl, new_prerender_site_instance_impl);
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
new_prerender_site_instance_impl->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_origin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(new_prerender_site_instance_impl->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(new_prerender_site_instance_impl->GetSiteURL() ==
GURL("https://foo.com") ||
new_prerender_site_instance_impl->IsDefaultSiteInstance());
}
// Basic test to make sure an origin opting-in in a prerendering FrameTree
// triggers registration of a non-opting-origin in an existing primary
// Frametree.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationPrerenderOptInHeaderTest,
SimplePrerenderSubOriginIsolationTest2) {
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
// Navigate child frame to a non-isolated origin "a.foo.com".
GURL non_isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("a.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, non_isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Create prerender tab, load isolated "a.foo.com".
Shell* prerender_tab = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(prerender_tab, GURL(https_server()->GetURL(
"a.foo.com", "/title1.html"))));
auto* prerender_web_contents =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(prerender_tab->web_contents());
set_prerender_web_contents(prerender_web_contents);
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL isolated_origin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("a.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
int host_id = prerender_helper_.AddPrerender(isolated_origin_url);
// Verify origin is isolated in the prerender IsolationContext.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
auto* prerender_site_instance_impl = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
prerender_helper_.GetPrerenderedMainFrameHost(host_id)
->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
prerender_site_instance_impl->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_origin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_site_instance_impl->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_site_instance_impl->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Verify in original tab that "a.foo.com" is now registered as a non-isolated
// origin.
auto* primary_site_instance_impl = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
shell()->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
primary_site_instance_impl->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_origin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Activate the prerendered page and confirm the isolated origin remains
// isolated.
prerender_helper_.NavigatePrimaryPage(isolated_origin_url);
auto* new_prerender_site_instance_impl = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
prerender_tab->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(prerender_site_instance_impl, new_prerender_site_instance_impl);
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
new_prerender_site_instance_impl->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_origin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_site_instance_impl->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(new_prerender_site_instance_impl->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// Further tests deep-dive into various scenarios for the isolation opt-ins.
// In this test the sub-origin is isolated because the header requests it. It
// will have a different site instance than the main frame.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
SimpleSubOriginIsolationTest) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Start off with an a(a) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated sub
// origin.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
GURL origin_url = url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url).GetURL();
BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
auto expected_isolated_suborigin_lock = ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(
SiteInfo(origin_url, origin_url,
/*requires_origin_keyed_process=*/true,
/*requires_origin_keyed_process_by_default=*/false,
/*is_sandboxed=*/false, UrlInfo::kInvalidUniqueSandboxId,
StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(browser_context),
WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated(), /*is_guest=*/false,
/*does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop=*/false,
/*is_jit_disabled=*/false, /*is_pdf=*/false,
/*is_fenced=*/false));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_frame_node->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
GURL expected_isolated_sub_origin =
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url).GetURL();
EXPECT_EQ(
expected_isolated_sub_origin,
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
EXPECT_EQ(expected_isolated_suborigin_lock,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(child_frame_node->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()));
EXPECT_EQ(
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(child_frame_node->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotRequestedAndNotOriginKeyed),
2),
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kRequestedAndOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
// Check that two same-site Origin-Agent-Cluster subframes in unrelated windows
// obey the subframe process reuse policy.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
OriginAgentClusterProcessReuse) {
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Start off with an a(a) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated
// suborigin.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(child->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Open an unrelated window and set up the same frame hierarchy there.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, test_url));
FrameTreeNode* new_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(new_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
FrameTreeNode* new_child = new_root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(new_child, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_NE(new_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
new_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Even though the two subframes should be in different BrowsingInstances,
// they should share the same process due to the subframe process reuse
// policy.
EXPECT_FALSE(
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->IsRelatedSiteInstance(
new_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()));
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
new_child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
}
// In this test the sub-origin is isolated because the header requests it. It
// will have the same site instance as the main frame, and it will be in the
// same process.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
SimpleSubOriginIsolationTest) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Start off with an a(a) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated sub
// origin.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
GURL origin_url = url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url).GetURL();
EXPECT_FALSE(
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsProcessIsolationForOriginAgentClusterEnabled());
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_frame_node->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url)));
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotRequestedAndNotOriginKeyed),
2),
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kRequestedAndOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
// This test is *nearly* the same as SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest.
// SimpleSubOriginIsolationTest, but here we have command-line isolated foo.com
// so it will be in a site instance with a non-empty ProcessLock. But the
// same-process OAC isolated.foo.com will still be in the same SiteInstance,
// and checks on the expected ProcessLock for isolated.foo.com should pass,
// i.e. it should be the same as for the foo.com process.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(
SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderWithIsolatedOriginTest,
SimpleSubOriginIsolationTest) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Start off with a foo(foo) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated
// sub origin. foo.com is isolated from the command line.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
GURL origin_url = url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url).GetURL();
EXPECT_FALSE(
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsProcessIsolationForOriginAgentClusterEnabled());
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_frame_node->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
ProcessLock root_process_lock = ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteInfo());
EXPECT_TRUE(root_process_lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_EQ(root_process_lock.lock_url(), GURL("https://foo.com/"));
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url)));
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotRequestedAndNotOriginKeyed),
2),
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kRequestedAndOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
// Verify OAC is calculated using the base URL when using LoadDataWithBaseURL()
// (analogous to Android WebView's loadDataWithBaseURL()) when the actual site
// does not specify an Origin-Agent-Cluster value.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
LoadDataWithBaseURLNoOAC) {
const GURL test_url = https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html");
TestNavigationObserver navigation_observer(shell()->web_contents(), 1);
shell()->LoadDataWithBaseURL(
test_url, "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body></body></html>", test_url);
navigation_observer.Wait();
// Even though this internally navigates to a data: URL (which would imply
// `window.originAgentCluster === true`, the base URL should be used for the
// OAC calculation.
EXPECT_EQ(false, EvalJs(shell(), "window.originAgentCluster"));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(
shell(), "document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'))"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(
ChildFrameAt(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), 0), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(false,
EvalJs(ChildFrameAt(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), 0),
"window.originAgentCluster"));
// If OAC is incorrectly calculated for `LoadDataWithBaseURL()`, this will
// fail the access checks in Blink because the two browsing contexts will be
// treated as cross-origin.
EXPECT_EQ("This page has no title.\n\n",
EvalJs(shell(), "window[0].document.body.textContent"));
}
// Verify OAC is calculated using the base URL when using LoadDataWithBaseURL()
// (analogous to Android WebView's loadDataWithBaseURL()). Unlike the previous
// test, the actual site specifies an Origin-Agent-Cluster value, which should
// be ignored.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
LoadDataWithBaseURLWithOAC) {
const GURL test_url = https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/isolate_origin");
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// `tab2` and `shell()` will be in separate browsing instances. As an
// optimization, browsing instances only track OAC consistency if an origin
// has ever sent OAC headers. Once an origin has sent OAC headers, this is
// tracked globally.
//
// This navigation marks "foo.com" as having sent OAC headers. This is
// important to validate that `LoadDataWithBaseURL()` uses the origin
// calculated from the base URL to update the non-isolated origin list in
// `shell()`'s browsing instance. If this is not done correctly, then loading
// "foo.com/isolate_origin" in the subframe will incorrectly use OAC in the
// subframe, which will be inconsistent with the main frame loaded via
// `LoadDataWithBaseURL()`.
Shell* tab2 = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(tab2, test_url));
TestNavigationObserver navigation_observer(shell()->web_contents(), 1);
shell()->LoadDataWithBaseURL(
test_url, "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body></body></html>", test_url);
navigation_observer.Wait();
// Even though this internally navigates to a data: URL (which would imply
// `window.originAgentCluster === true`, the base URL should be used for the
// OAC calculation.
EXPECT_EQ(false, EvalJs(shell(), "window.originAgentCluster"));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(
shell(), "document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'))"));
// Even though this navigation sets the OAC header value, it should be
// ignored, since the SiteInstance for foo.com is already site-keyed.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(
ChildFrameAt(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), 0), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(false,
EvalJs(ChildFrameAt(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), 0),
"window.originAgentCluster"));
// The two frames should be same-origin to each other, since the OAC header
// value should be ignored.
EXPECT_EQ("isolate me!",
EvalJs(shell(), "window[0].document.body.textContent"));
}
// This test checks that same-process OriginAgentCluster won't crash and will
// apply properly when used on a localhost URL. See https://crbug.com/1276155.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SameProcessOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest, Localhost) {
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL url(https_server()->GetURL("localhost", "/isolate_origin"));
url::Origin origin(url::Origin::Create(url));
EXPECT_TRUE(SiteIsolationPolicy::IsOriginAgentClusterEnabled());
EXPECT_FALSE(
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsProcessIsolationForOriginAgentClusterEnabled());
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
EXPECT_FALSE(root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_FALSE(ShouldOriginGetOptInProcessIsolation(origin));
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
auto isolation_result = policy->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetIsolationContext(),
origin, MakeOACIsolationState(false));
EXPECT_TRUE(isolation_result.is_origin_agent_cluster());
EXPECT_FALSE(isolation_result.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(), origin));
}
// This test verifies that --disable-web-security overrides same-process
// OriginAgentCluster (i.e. disables it).
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SameProcessNoWebSecurityOriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
DisableWebSecurityDisablesOriginAgentCluster) {
// Make sure we request the header for OriginAgentCluster for the child; the
// fact that this test uses --disable-web-security will override the header.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL main_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), main_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, isolated_suborigin_url));
// Web security is disabled so everything should be same-origin and
// accessible across browsing contexts.
EXPECT_EQ(false, EvalJs(child_frame_node, "window.originAgentCluster"));
std::string parent_body_content =
EvalJs(root, "document.body.textContent").ExtractString();
// Make sure that the child frame doesn't think it's isolated.
EXPECT_EQ(parent_body_content,
EvalJs(child_frame_node, "window.parent.document.body.textContent")
.ExtractString());
}
// In this test the sub-origin isn't isolated because no header is set. It will
// have the same site instance as the main frame.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
SimpleSubOriginNonIsolationTest) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
// Start off with an a(a) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated sub
// origin.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotRequestedAndNotOriginKeyed),
3)));
}
// This test verifies that renderer-initiated navigations to/from isolated
// sub-origins works as expected.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
RendererInitiatedNavigations) {
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
GURL isolated_sub_origin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
{
// Navigate the child to an isolated origin.
TestFrameNavigationObserver observer(child);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(
child, "location.href = '" + isolated_sub_origin_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
}
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
GURL non_isolated_sub_origin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("bar.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
{
// Navigate the child to a non-isolated origin.
TestFrameNavigationObserver observer(child);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(child, "location.href = '" +
non_isolated_sub_origin_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
}
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
// Check that navigating a main frame from an non-isolated origin to an
// isolated origin and vice versa swaps processes and uses a new SiteInstance,
// both for renderer-initiated and browser-initiated navigations.
// Note: this test is essentially identical to
// IsolatedOriginTest.MainFrameNavigation.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest, MainFrameNavigation) {
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL unisolated_url(https_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), unisolated_url));
// Open a same-site popup to keep the www.foo.com process alive.
Shell* popup = OpenPopup(shell(), GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL), "foo");
SiteInstance* unisolated_instance =
popup->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
RenderProcessHost* unisolated_process =
popup->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
// Go to isolated.foo.com with a renderer-initiated navigation.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(web_contents(), isolated_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> isolated_instance =
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
RenderProcessHost* isolated_process =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_instance, isolated_instance);
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_process, isolated_process);
// The site URL for isolated.foo.com should be the full origin rather than
// scheme and eTLD+1.
EXPECT_EQ(https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/"),
isolated_instance->GetSiteURL());
// Now use a renderer-initiated navigation to go to an unisolated origin,
// www.foo.com. This should end up back in the `popup`'s process.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(web_contents(), unisolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(unisolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(unisolated_process,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Now, perform a browser-initiated navigation to an isolated origin and
// ensure that this ends up in a new process and SiteInstance for
// isolated.foo.com.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> isolated_instance2 =
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
RenderProcessHost* isolated_process2 =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_instance, isolated_instance2);
EXPECT_NE(isolated_instance, isolated_instance2);
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_process, isolated_process2);
// Go back to www.foo.com: this should end up in the unisolated process.
{
TestNavigationObserver back_observer(web_contents());
web_contents()->GetController().GoBack();
back_observer.Wait();
}
EXPECT_EQ(unisolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(unisolated_process,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Go back again. This should go to isolated.foo.com in an isolated process.
{
TestNavigationObserver back_observer(web_contents());
web_contents()->GetController().GoBack();
back_observer.Wait();
}
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_process,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Do a renderer-initiated navigation from isolated.foo.com to another
// isolated origin and ensure there is a different isolated process.
GURL second_isolated_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(web_contents(), second_isolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(https_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/"),
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
EXPECT_NE(isolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
}
// This test ensures that if an origin starts off being isolated in a
// BrowsingInstance, it continues that way within the BrowsingInstance, even
// if a new policy is received that removes the opt-in request.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
OriginIsolationStateRetainedForBrowsingInstance) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Start off with an a(a,a) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated
// sub origin.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com, foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(3u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node0 = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node1 = root->child_at(1);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node0, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node0->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Change the server's responses to stop isolating the sub-origin. It should
// still be isolated, to remain consistent with the other frame.
SetHeaderValue("?0");
WebContentsConsoleObserver console_observer(shell()->web_contents());
console_observer.SetPattern(
"The page did not request an origin-keyed agent cluster, but was put in "
"one anyway*");
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node1, isolated_suborigin_url));
ASSERT_TRUE(console_observer.Wait());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// The two sub-frames should be in the same site instance.
EXPECT_EQ(child_frame_node0->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Make sure the master opt-in list still has the origin tracked.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url)));
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(
// Original loads of a(a,a) go here.
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotRequestedAndNotOriginKeyed),
3),
// Second isolated subframe load goes here.
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotRequestedButOriginKeyed),
1),
// First isolated subframe load goes here.
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kRequestedAndOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
// This test ensures that if an origin starts off not being isolated in a
// BrowsingInstance, it continues that way within the BrowsingInstance, even
// if the header starts being sent.
// Case #1 where the non-opted-in origin is currently in the frame tree.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
OriginNonIsolationStateRetainedForBrowsingInstance1) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
SetHeaderValue("?0");
// Start off with an a(a,a) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated
// sub origin.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com, foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(3u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node0 = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node1 = root->child_at(1);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node0, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node0->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Change the server responses to start isolating the sub-origin. It should
// still be not-isolated, to remain consistent with the other frame.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
WebContentsConsoleObserver console_observer(shell()->web_contents());
console_observer.SetPattern(
"The page requested an origin-keyed agent cluster using the "
"Origin-Agent-Cluster header, but could not be origin-keyed*");
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node1, isolated_suborigin_url));
ASSERT_TRUE(console_observer.Wait());
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Make sure the master opt-in list has the origin listed.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url)));
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(
// Original loads of a(a,a) go here.
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotRequestedAndNotOriginKeyed),
4),
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kRequestedButNotOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
// This test ensures that if an origin starts off not being isolated in a
// BrowsingInstance, it continues that way within the BrowsingInstance, even
// if the header starts being sent.
// Case #2 where the non-opted-in origin is currently not in the frame tree.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
OriginNonIsolationStateRetainedForBrowsingInstance2) {
SetHeaderValue("?0");
// Start off with an a(a) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated sub
// origin.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node0 = root->child_at(0);
// Even though we're navigating to isolated.foo.com, there's no manifest
// requesting opt-in, so it should end up in the same SiteInstance as the
// main frame.
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node0, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node0->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// This navigation removes isolated_suborigin_url from the frame tree, but it
// should still be in the session history.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(
child_frame_node0, https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html")));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node0->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Change the server to start isolating the sub-origin. It should
// still be not isolated, to remain consistent with the other frame.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node0, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node0->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Make sure the master opt-in list has the origin listed.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url)));
// Make sure the current browsing instance does *not* isolate the origin.
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// This test makes sure that a different tab in the same BrowsingInstance where
// an origin originally did not opt-in respects that state even if the
// server sends a different header.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
OriginNonIsolationStateRetainedForPopup) {
SetHeaderValue("?0");
// Start off with an a(a,a) page, then navigate the subframe to an isolated
// sub origin.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(foo.com)"));
GURL isolated_suborigin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node0 = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node0, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node0->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Change the server to start isolating the sub-origin. It should
// not be isolated, to remain consistent with the other frame.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Open a popup in the same browsing instance, and navigate it to the
// not-opted-in origin. Even though the manifest now requests isolation, it
// should not opt-in since it's in the same BrowsingInstance where it
// originally wasn't opted in.
Shell* popup = OpenPopup(shell(), isolated_suborigin_url, "foo");
auto* popup_web_contents = popup->web_contents();
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(popup_web_contents, isolated_suborigin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(shell()->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowsingInstanceId(),
popup_web_contents->GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowsingInstanceId());
// Make sure the current browsing instance does *not* isolate the origin.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_suborigin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// This test creates a no-opener popup that is origin-isolated, and has two
// same-sub-origin iframes, one of which requests isolation and one that
// doesn't. The non-isolated child commits first, so the second child shouldn't
// get isolation, but more importantly we shouldn't crash on a NOTREACHED() in
// RenderFrameHostManager that is verifying that the second child frame was
// put in a compatible renderer process.
// https://crbug.com/1099718
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
NoKillForBrowsingInstanceDifferencesInProcess) {
SetHeaderValue("?1");
GURL opener_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), opener_url));
// Create content for popup. The first subframe is in a sub-domain of the
// popup mainframe, which is an isolated base-origin. The second subframe is
// in the same sub-origin as the first, but requests isolation. The isolation
// request will fail, and both subframes will end up in the same site-locked
// process as the opener document (due to subframe process reuse).
GURL popup_subframe1_url(
https_server()->GetURL("sub.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL popup_subframe2_url(
https_server()->GetURL("sub.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
// This is the HTML content for the popup mainframe.
std::string popup_content = base::StringPrintf(
R"(<!DOCTYPE html>
<html><head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>This page should not crash when window.open()ed</title>
</head><body>
<iframe src="%s"></iframe>
<iframe></iframe>
</body></html>)",
popup_subframe1_url.spec().c_str());
// The next navigation with relative URL = "/isolate_origin" should serve this
// content.
AddContentToQueue(popup_content);
// Open popup.
GURL isolated_popup_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
// Opening the popup with "noopener" guarantees that the isolated popup is in
// a different BrowsingInstance from the opener.
Shell* popup =
OpenPopup(shell(), isolated_popup_url, "windowName1", "noopener",
false /* expect_return_from_window_open */);
// If we got here without crashing, all that remains is to verify everything
// is isolated/not-isolated as expected.
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, popup);
RenderFrameHostImpl* popup_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(popup->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryMainFrame();
EXPECT_EQ(2U, popup_root->child_count());
FrameTreeNode* popup_child1 = popup_root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* popup_child2 = popup_root->child_at(1);
// Navigate the second child iframe after the first one has loaded.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateFrameToURL(popup_child2, popup_subframe2_url));
// Set cookie on `popup_child1` to make sure we don't get a renderer kill in
// the process with the opener.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(popup_child1, "document.cookie = 'foo=bar';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=bar", EvalJs(popup_child1, "document.cookie"));
// Verify state of various SiteIstances, BrowsingInstances and processes.
SiteInstanceImpl* root_instance = popup_root->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(root_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
SiteInstanceImpl* child1_instance =
popup_child1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
SiteInstanceImpl* child2_instance =
popup_child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(child1_instance, child2_instance);
EXPECT_NE(child1_instance, root_instance);
// Make sure child1 and the opener share the same process, but different
// BrowsingInstances.
SiteInstanceImpl* opener_instance =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell()->web_contents())->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(child1_instance->GetBrowsingInstanceId(),
opener_instance->GetBrowsingInstanceId());
EXPECT_EQ(child1_instance->GetProcess(), opener_instance->GetProcess());
EXPECT_FALSE(child2_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// Same as NoKillForBrowsingInstanceDifferencesInProcess, except the starting
// page has an isolated iframe that matches the origin that won't get isolation
// in the popup's BrowsingInstance. Since this means that the first
// BrowsingInstance will show sub.foo.com as isolated, then if
// CanAccessDataForOrigin only checks the first BrowsingInstance it will get the
// wrong result.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
NoKillForBrowsingInstanceDifferencesInProcess2) {
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Start on a page with same-site iframe.
GURL opener_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), opener_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
GURL isolated_opener_iframe_url(
https_server()->GetURL("sub.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateFrameToURL(child, isolated_opener_iframe_url));
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(child->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Create content for popup. The first subframe is in a sub-domain of the
// popup mainframe, which is an isolated base-origin. The second subframe is
// in the same sub-origin as the first, but requests isolation. The isolation
// request will fail, and both subframes will end up in the same site-locked
// process as the opener document (due to subframe process reuse).
GURL popup_subframe1_url(
https_server()->GetURL("sub.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL popup_subframe2_url(
https_server()->GetURL("sub.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
// This is the HTML content for the popup mainframe.
std::string popup_content = base::StringPrintf(
R"(<!DOCTYPE html>
<html><head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>This page should not crash when window.open()ed</title>
</head><body>
<iframe src="%s"></iframe>
<iframe></iframe>
</body></html>)",
popup_subframe1_url.spec().c_str());
// The next navigation with relative URL = "/isolate_origin" should serve this
// content.
AddContentToQueue(popup_content);
// Open popup.
GURL isolated_popup_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
// Opening the popup with "noopener" guarantees that the isolated popup is in
// a different BrowsingInstance from the opener.
Shell* popup =
OpenPopup(shell(), isolated_popup_url, "windowName1", "noopener",
false /* expect_return_from_window_open */);
// If we got here without crashing, all that remains is to verify everything
// is isolated/not-isolated as expected.
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, popup);
RenderFrameHostImpl* popup_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(popup->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryMainFrame();
EXPECT_EQ(2U, popup_root->child_count());
FrameTreeNode* popup_child1 = popup_root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* popup_child2 = popup_root->child_at(1);
// Navigate the second child iframe after the first one has loaded.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateFrameToURL(popup_child2, popup_subframe2_url));
// Set cookie on `popup_child1` to make sure we don't get a renderer kill in
// the process with the opener.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(popup_child1, "document.cookie = 'foo=bar';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=bar", EvalJs(popup_child1, "document.cookie"));
// Verify state of various SiteIstances, BrowsingInstances and processes.
SiteInstanceImpl* root_instance = popup_root->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(root_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
SiteInstanceImpl* child1_instance =
popup_child1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
SiteInstanceImpl* child2_instance =
popup_child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(child1_instance, child2_instance);
EXPECT_NE(child1_instance, root_instance);
// Make sure child1 and the opener share the same process, but different
// BrowsingInstances.
SiteInstanceImpl* opener_instance =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell()->web_contents())->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(child1_instance->GetBrowsingInstanceId(),
opener_instance->GetBrowsingInstanceId());
EXPECT_EQ(child1_instance->GetProcess(), opener_instance->GetProcess());
EXPECT_FALSE(child2_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// This test handles the case where the base origin is isolated, but a
// sub-origin isn't. In this case we need to place the sub-origin in a site-
// keyed SiteInstance with the same site URL as the origin-keyed SiteInstance
// used for the isolated base origin. Note: only the isolated base origin will
// have a port in this test, as the non-isolated sub-origin will have its port
// value stripped. The test IsolatedBaseOriginNoPorts tests the case where
// neither the isolated base origin nor the non-isolated sub-origin has a port
// value.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest, IsolatedBaseOrigin) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
SetHeaderValue("?1");
// Start off with an isolated base-origin in an a(a) configuration, then
// navigate the subframe to a sub-origin no requesting isolation.
GURL test_url(https_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/isolated_base_origin_with_subframe.html"));
GURL non_isolated_sub_origin1(
https_server()->GetURL("non_isolated1.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL non_isolated_sub_origin2(
https_server()->GetURL("non_isolated2.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(3u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node1 = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node2 = root->child_at(1);
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node1, non_isolated_sub_origin1));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node2, non_isolated_sub_origin2));
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(
policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(test_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin1),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
child_frame_node2->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin2),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Base origin and subdomains should have different SiteInstances.
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Both non-isolated subdomains are in the same SiteInstance.
EXPECT_EQ(child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(
GURL("https://foo.com"),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
// The base-origin and the children are in different processes.
EXPECT_NE(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess());
// Make sure the master opt-in list has the base origin as isolated, but not
// the sub-origins.
BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
browser_context, url::Origin::Create(test_url)));
EXPECT_FALSE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
browser_context, url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin1)));
EXPECT_FALSE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
browser_context, url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin2)));
EXPECT_THAT(
histograms.GetAllSamples("Navigation.OriginAgentCluster.Result"),
testing::ElementsAre(
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kNotRequestedAndNotOriginKeyed),
2),
base::Bucket(
static_cast<int>(NavigationRequest::OriginAgentClusterEndResult::
kRequestedAndOriginKeyed),
1)));
}
// This test is the same as OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest
// .IsolatedBaseOrigin except it uses port-free URLs. This is critical since we
// can have two SiteInstances with the same SiteURL as long as one is
// origin-keyed and the other isn't. Site URLs used to be used as map-keys but
// with opt-in origin isolation we need to also consider the keying flag.
// When the URLs all have non-default ports, we will never have duplicate
// site URLs since the site-keyed one will have the port stripped.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
IsolatedBaseOriginNoPorts) {
GURL isolated_base_origin_url("https://foo.com");
GURL non_isolated_sub_origin_url_a("https://a.foo.com");
GURL non_isolated_sub_origin_url_b("https://b.foo.com");
// Since the embedded test server only works for URLs with non-default ports,
// use a URLLoaderInterceptor to mimic port-free operation. This allows the
// rest of the test to operate as if all URLs are using the default ports.
URLLoaderInterceptor interceptor(base::BindLambdaForTesting(
[&](URLLoaderInterceptor::RequestParams* params) {
if (params->url_request.url.host() == "foo.com") {
if (params->url_request.url.path() != "/")
return false;
const std::string headers =
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n"
"Content-Type: text/html\n"
"Origin-Agent-Cluster: ?1\n";
// Note: this call would normally get the headers from
// isolated_base_origin_with_subframe.html.mock-http-headers,
// but those are meant for use with a
// OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest. and won't work here, so we
// override them.
URLLoaderInterceptor::WriteResponse(
"content/test/data/isolated_base_origin_with_subframe.html",
params->client.get(), &headers, absl::optional<net::SSLInfo>());
return true;
}
if (params->url_request.url.host() == "a.foo.com" ||
params->url_request.url.host() == "b.foo.com") {
URLLoaderInterceptor::WriteResponse("content/test/data/title1.html",
params->client.get());
return true;
}
// Not handled by us.
return false;
}));
// Load the isolated base url.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_base_origin_url));
EXPECT_EQ(3u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node1 = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node2 = root->child_at(1);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node1,
non_isolated_sub_origin_url_a));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame_node2,
non_isolated_sub_origin_url_b));
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(isolated_base_origin_url),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin_url_a),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
child_frame_node2->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin_url_b),
MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Base origin and subdomains should have different SiteInstances.
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Both SiteInstances should have the same site URL, because they have no
// port.
EXPECT_EQ(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteInfo(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo());
// Both non-isolated subdomains are in the same SiteInstance.
EXPECT_EQ(child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame_node2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// The base-origin and the children are in different processes.
EXPECT_NE(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess(),
child_frame_node1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess());
// Make sure the master opt-in list has the base origin isolated and the sub
// origins both not isolated.
BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
browser_context, url::Origin::Create(isolated_base_origin_url)));
EXPECT_FALSE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
browser_context, url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin_url_a)));
EXPECT_FALSE(policy->HasOriginEverRequestedOriginAgentClusterValue(
browser_context, url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_sub_origin_url_b)));
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
SeparateBrowserContextTest) {
GURL isolated_origin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
Shell* shell_otr = CreateOffTheRecordBrowser();
EXPECT_NE(shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(),
shell_otr->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext());
// The isolation header is not present, so this navigation will result in a
// site-keyed instance.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell_otr, isolated_origin_url));
WebContentsImpl* web_contents_shell_otr =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell_otr->web_contents());
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance_shell_otr =
web_contents_shell_otr->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root()
->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(
site_instance_shell_otr->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
url::Origin isolated_origin = url::Origin::Create(isolated_origin_url);
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Now navigate a different BrowserContext to the same origin, but this time
// requesting isolation. The presence of the site-keyed instance in a
// different BrowsingInstance shouldn't prevent this navigation from being
// isolated. The presence of the site-keyed instance in a different
// BrowsingInstance (whether in the same BrowserContext or a different one)
// shouldn't prevent this navigation from being isolated. We'll test
// cross-BrowserContext interactions below.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_origin_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell()->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root()
->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Make sure isolating the origin in the main context didn't affect it in the
// off-the-record context. Specifically, if the opting-in in shell() did leak
// to shell_otr, then `isolated_origin` will be recorded as non-opted in in
// that BrowsingInstance. The following check makes sure that
// `isolated_origin` is not in the non-opt-in list, verifying that the
// internal bookkeeping is specific to each BrowserContext. Isolating the
// bookkeeping by BrowserContext prevents timing attacks from detecting
// whether an origin has been visited in another BrowserContext by detecting
// the global walk.
// At this stage, `isolated_origin` is not in the non-opt-in list for this
// BrowsingInstance, since we haven't yet done a global walk in the OTR
// BrowserContext, so DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation will return true.
// However, during the navigation by the OpenPopup call below that global walk
// will be triggered before the url's isolation status is set. This walk is
// triggered by the call to CheckForIsolationOptIn() in
// NavigationRequest::OnResponseStarted().
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell_otr->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root()
->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Make sure the OTR context does a global (i.e. profile) walk if we attempt
// to now opt-in when we didn't before.
Shell* popup = OpenPopup(shell_otr, isolated_origin_url, "popup_otr");
WebContentsImpl* web_contents_popup =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(popup->web_contents());
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance_popup =
web_contents_popup->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root()
->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance();
// This shouldn't be isolated because we already have a non-isolated version
// of this origin in shell_otr's main frame, in the same BrowsingInstance.
EXPECT_FALSE(
site_instance_popup->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Since the OpenPopup navigation triggered a global walk, `isolated_origin`
// was added to the non-opt-in list, so now calling
// DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation will return false.
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
site_instance_popup->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Opening a new tab in the OTR profile, which will create a new
// BrowsingInstance, should be allowed to isolate.
Shell* shell_otr_tab2 = CreateOffTheRecordBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell_otr_tab2, isolated_origin_url));
WebContentsImpl* web_contenst_shell_otr_tab2 =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell_otr_tab2->web_contents());
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance_shell_otr_tab2 =
web_contenst_shell_otr_tab2->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root()
->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(site_instance_shell_otr_tab2->GetSiteInfo()
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
site_instance_shell_otr_tab2->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// This test creates a scenario where we have a frame that is on the initial
// NavigationEntry, and then we created another frame with the same origin
// that opts-in to isolation. The opt-in triggers a walk of the session history
// and the frame tree ... the session history won't pick up the first frame, but
// the frame-tree walk should.
// TODO(https://crbug.com/608402): Once every created frame is guaranteed to
// have a FrameNavigationEntry and thus represented in the sesion history, we
// probably can remove the frame-tree walk.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest, FrameTreeTest) {
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(),
https_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title1.html")));
// Have tab1 call window.open() to create blank tab2.
FrameTreeNode* tab1_root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
ShellAddedObserver new_shell_observer;
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(tab1_root->current_frame_host(),
"window.w = window.open('/nocontent')"));
Shell* tab2_shell = new_shell_observer.GetShell();
// Create iframe in tab2.
FrameTreeNode* tab2_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(tab2_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(tab2_root->current_frame_host(),
"var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');"
"document.body.appendChild(iframe);"));
EXPECT_EQ(1U, tab2_root->child_count());
FrameTreeNode* tab2_child = tab2_root->child_at(0);
GURL isolated_origin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
// Navigate the iframe in tab2 to `isolated_origin_url` without requesting
// isolation, so it won't be isolated.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateFrameToURL(tab2_child, isolated_origin_url));
// Do a browser-initiated navigation of tab1 to the same origin, but isolate
// it this time. This should place the two frames with `isolated_origin_url`
// into different BrowsingInstances.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_origin_url));
// Since the same origin exists in two tabs, but one is isolated and the other
// isn't, we expect them to be in different BrowsingInstances.
EXPECT_NE(tab1_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
tab2_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(tab1_root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext()
.browsing_instance_id(),
tab2_child->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext()
.browsing_instance_id());
url::Origin isolated_origin = url::Origin::Create(isolated_origin_url);
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Verify that `isolated origin` is in the non-opt-in list for tab2's
// child's BrowsingInstance. We do this by requesting opt-in for the origin,
// then verifying that it is denied by DoesOriginRequestOptInIsolation.
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
tab2_child->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Verify that `isolated_origin` in tab1 is indeed isolated.
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
tab1_root->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Verify that the tab2 child frame is on the initial NavigationEntry.
EXPECT_TRUE(tab2_shell->web_contents()
->GetController()
.GetLastCommittedEntry()
->IsInitialEntry());
// Now, create a second frame in tab2 and navigate it to
// `isolated_origin_url`. Even though isolation is requested, it should not
// be isolated.
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(tab2_root->current_frame_host(),
"var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');"
"document.body.appendChild(iframe);"));
EXPECT_EQ(2U, tab2_root->child_count());
FrameTreeNode* tab2_child2 = tab2_root->child_at(1);
NavigateFrameToURL(tab2_child2, isolated_origin_url);
EXPECT_EQ(tab2_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
tab2_child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Check that the two child frames can script each other.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(tab2_child2, R"(
parent.frames[0].cross_frame_property_test = 'hello from t2c2'; )"));
EXPECT_EQ("hello from t2c2",
EvalJs(tab2_child, "window.cross_frame_property_test;"));
}
// Similar to FrameTreeTest, but we stop the navigation that's not requesting
// isolation at the pending commit state in tab2, then verify that the FrameTree
// walk has correctly registered the origin as non-isolated in tab2, but
// isolated in tab1.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
FrameTreeTestPendingCommit) {
GURL isolated_origin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
TestNavigationManager non_isolated_delayer(shell()->web_contents(),
isolated_origin_url);
shell()->web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(
isolated_origin_url, Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, std::string());
EXPECT_TRUE(non_isolated_delayer.WaitForResponse());
Shell* tab2 = CreateBrowser();
// Do a browser-initiated navigation of tab2 to the same origin, but isolate
// it this time. This should place the two frames with `isolated_origin_url`
// into different BrowsingInstances.
SetHeaderValue("?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(tab2, isolated_origin_url));
// Now commit the non-isolated navigation.
ASSERT_TRUE(non_isolated_delayer.WaitForNavigationFinished());
FrameTreeNode* tab1_root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
SiteInstanceImpl* tab1_site_instance =
tab1_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
FrameTreeNode* tab2_root = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(tab2->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
SiteInstanceImpl* tab2_site_instance =
tab2_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(tab1_site_instance, tab2_site_instance);
EXPECT_NE(tab1_site_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id(),
tab2_site_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id());
// Despite the non-isolated navigation only being at pending-commit when we
// got the response for the isolated navigation, it should be properly
// registered as non-isolated in its browsing instance.
url::Origin isolated_origin = url::Origin::Create(isolated_origin_url);
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Verify that `isolated origin` is in the non-opt-in list for tab1's
// BrowsingInstance. We do this by requesting opt-in for the origin, then
// verifying that it is denied by DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation.
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
tab1_site_instance->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Verify that `isolated_origin` in tab2 is indeed isolated.
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
tab2_site_instance->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// Helper class to navigate a second tab to a specified URL that requests opt-in
// origin isolation just before the first tab processes the next
// DidCommitProvisionalLoad message.
class InjectIsolationRequestingNavigation
: public DidCommitNavigationInterceptor {
public:
InjectIsolationRequestingNavigation(
OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest* test_framework,
WebContents* tab1_web_contents,
Shell* tab2,
const GURL& url)
: DidCommitNavigationInterceptor(tab1_web_contents),
test_framework_(test_framework),
tab2_(tab2),
url_(url) {}
InjectIsolationRequestingNavigation(
const InjectIsolationRequestingNavigation&) = delete;
InjectIsolationRequestingNavigation& operator=(
const InjectIsolationRequestingNavigation&) = delete;
bool was_called() { return was_called_; }
private:
// DidCommitNavigationInterceptor implementation.
bool WillProcessDidCommitNavigation(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
NavigationRequest* navigation_request,
mojom::DidCommitProvisionalLoadParamsPtr*,
mojom::DidCommitProvisionalLoadInterfaceParamsPtr* interface_params)
override {
was_called_ = true;
// Performa a navigation of `tab2_` to `url_`. `url_` should request
// isolation.
test_framework_->SetHeaderValue("?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(tab2_, *url_));
return true;
}
raw_ptr<OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest> test_framework_;
raw_ptr<Shell, DanglingUntriaged> tab2_;
const raw_ref<const GURL> url_;
bool was_called_ = false;
};
// TODO(crbug.com/1110767): flaky on Android builders since 2020-07-28.
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_FrameTreeTestBeforeDidCommit DISABLED_FrameTreeTestBeforeDidCommit
#else
#define MAYBE_FrameTreeTestBeforeDidCommit FrameTreeTestBeforeDidCommit
#endif
// This test is similar to the one above, but exercises the pending navigation
// when it's at a different stage, namely between the CommitNavigation and
// DidCommitProvisionalLoad, rather than at WillProcessResponse.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(OriginIsolationOptInHeaderTest,
MAYBE_FrameTreeTestBeforeDidCommit) {
GURL isolated_origin_url(
https_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/isolate_origin"));
FrameTreeNode* tab1_root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
// We use the following, slightly more verbose, code instead of
// CreateBrowser() in order to avoid issues with NavigateToURL() in
// InjectIsolationRequestingNavigation::WillProcessDidCommitNavigation()
// getting stuck when it calls for WaitForLoadStop internally.
Shell* tab2 =
Shell::CreateNewWindow(shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(),
GURL(), nullptr, gfx::Size());
InjectIsolationRequestingNavigation injector(this, web_contents(), tab2,
isolated_origin_url);
{
TestNavigationObserver tab1_navigation_observer(shell()->web_contents(), 1);
tab1_navigation_observer.set_expected_initial_url(isolated_origin_url);
shell()->LoadURL(isolated_origin_url);
// Waiting for DidNavigationFinished is sufficient to ensure that
// `injector.was_called()`. We can't waiting for DidStopLoading, because
// running a nested message loop in the injector confuses
// TestNavigationObserver by changing the order of notifications.
tab1_navigation_observer.WaitForNavigationFinished();
}
EXPECT_TRUE(injector.was_called());
SiteInstanceImpl* tab1_site_instance =
tab1_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
FrameTreeNode* tab2_root = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(tab2->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
SiteInstanceImpl* tab2_site_instance =
tab2_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(tab1_site_instance, tab2_site_instance);
EXPECT_NE(tab1_site_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id(),
tab2_site_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id());
// Despite the non-isolated navigation only being at pending-commit when we
// got the response for the isolated navigation, it should be properly
// registered as non-isolated in its browsing instance.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
url::Origin isolated_origin = url::Origin::Create(isolated_origin_url);
// Verify that `isolated origin` is in the non-opt-in list for tab1's
// BrowsingInstance. We do this by requesting opt-in for the origin, then
// verifying that it is denied by DoesOriginRequestOptInIsolation.
EXPECT_FALSE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
tab1_site_instance->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(true))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
// Verify that `isolated_origin` in tab2 is indeed isolated.
EXPECT_TRUE(policy
->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
tab2_site_instance->GetIsolationContext(),
isolated_origin, MakeOACIsolationState(false))
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
class StrictOriginIsolationTest : public IsolatedOriginTestBase {
public:
StrictOriginIsolationTest() = default;
~StrictOriginIsolationTest() override = default;
StrictOriginIsolationTest(const StrictOriginIsolationTest&) = delete;
StrictOriginIsolationTest& operator=(const StrictOriginIsolationTest&) =
delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen());
// This is needed for this test to run properly on platforms where
// --site-per-process isn't the default, such as Android.
IsolateAllSitesForTesting(command_line);
feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(features::kStrictOriginIsolation);
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
embedded_test_server()->StartAcceptingConnections();
}
// Helper function that creates an http URL for `host` that includes the test
// server's port and returns the strict ProcessLock for that URL.
ProcessLock GetStrictProcessLockForHost(const std::string& host) {
return GetStrictProcessLock(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(host, "/"));
}
private:
base::test::ScopedFeatureList feature_list_;
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(StrictOriginIsolationTest, SubframesAreIsolated) {
GURL test_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(mail.foo.com,bar.foo.com(foo.com),foo.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(5u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
// Make sure we have three separate processes.
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
RenderFrameHost* main_frame = root->current_frame_host();
int main_frame_id = main_frame->GetProcess()->GetID();
RenderFrameHost* child_frame0 = root->child_at(0)->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* child_frame1 = root->child_at(1)->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* child_frame2 = root->child_at(2)->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* grandchild_frame0 =
root->child_at(1)->child_at(0)->current_frame_host();
EXPECT_NE(main_frame_id, child_frame0->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(main_frame_id, child_frame1->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(main_frame_id, child_frame2->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(main_frame_id, grandchild_frame0->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(GetStrictProcessLockForHost("foo.com"),
main_frame->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
EXPECT_EQ(GetStrictProcessLockForHost("mail.foo.com"),
child_frame0->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
EXPECT_EQ(GetStrictProcessLockForHost("bar.foo.com"),
child_frame1->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
EXPECT_EQ(GetStrictProcessLockForHost("foo.com"),
child_frame2->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
EXPECT_EQ(GetStrictProcessLockForHost("foo.com"),
grandchild_frame0->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
// Navigate child_frame1 to a new origin ... it should get its own process.
FrameTreeNode* child_frame2_node = root->child_at(2);
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
const auto expected_foo_lock = GetStrictProcessLock(foo_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(child_frame2_node, foo_url));
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child_frame2_node->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// The old RenderFrameHost for subframe3 will no longer be valid, so get the
// new one.
child_frame2 = root->child_at(2)->current_frame_host();
EXPECT_NE(main_frame->GetProcess()->GetID(),
child_frame2->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(expected_foo_lock, child_frame2->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(StrictOriginIsolationTest, MainframesAreIsolated) {
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
const auto expected_foo_lock = GetStrictProcessLock(foo_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
EXPECT_EQ(1u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
auto foo_process_id =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
SiteInstanceImpl* foo_site_instance = web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(expected_foo_lock,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(foo_site_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(foo_site_instance->GetSiteInfo()),
policy->GetProcessLock(foo_process_id));
GURL sub_foo_url =
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("sub.foo.com", "/title1.html");
const auto expected_sub_foo_lock = GetStrictProcessLock(sub_foo_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), sub_foo_url));
auto sub_foo_process_id =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
SiteInstanceImpl* sub_foo_site_instance = web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(expected_sub_foo_lock,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(sub_foo_site_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(sub_foo_site_instance->GetSiteInfo()),
policy->GetProcessLock(sub_foo_process_id));
EXPECT_NE(foo_process_id, sub_foo_process_id);
EXPECT_NE(foo_site_instance->GetSiteURL(),
sub_foo_site_instance->GetSiteURL());
// Now verify with a renderer-initiated navigation.
GURL another_foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("another.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
const auto expected_another_foo_lock = GetStrictProcessLock(another_foo_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(shell(), another_foo_url));
auto another_foo_process_id =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
SiteInstanceImpl* another_foo_site_instance =
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(another_foo_process_id, sub_foo_process_id);
EXPECT_NE(another_foo_process_id, foo_process_id);
EXPECT_EQ(
expected_another_foo_lock,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(another_foo_site_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(another_foo_site_instance->GetSiteInfo()),
policy->GetProcessLock(another_foo_process_id));
EXPECT_NE(another_foo_site_instance, foo_site_instance);
EXPECT_NE(expected_foo_lock, expected_sub_foo_lock);
EXPECT_NE(expected_sub_foo_lock, expected_another_foo_lock);
EXPECT_NE(expected_another_foo_lock, expected_foo_lock);
}
// Ensure that navigations across two URLs that resolve to the same effective
// URL won't result in a renderer kill with strict origin isolation. See
// https://crbug.com/961386.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(StrictOriginIsolationTest,
NavigateToURLsWithSameEffectiveURL) {
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL bar_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL app_url(GetWebUIURL("translated"));
// Set up effective URL translation that maps both `foo_url` and `bar_url` to
// `app_url`.
EffectiveURLContentBrowserTestContentBrowserClient modified_client(
false /* requires_dedicated_process */);
modified_client.AddTranslation(foo_url, app_url);
modified_client.AddTranslation(bar_url, app_url);
// Calculate the expected SiteInfo for each URL. Both `foo_url` and
// `bar_url` should have a site URL of `app_url`, but the process locks
// should be foo.com and bar.com.
SiteInfo foo_site_info = SiteInfo::CreateForTesting(
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetIsolationContext(), foo_url);
EXPECT_EQ(app_url, foo_site_info.site_url());
EXPECT_EQ(foo_url.DeprecatedGetOriginAsURL(),
foo_site_info.process_lock_url());
SiteInfo bar_site_info = SiteInfo::CreateForTesting(
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetIsolationContext(), bar_url);
EXPECT_EQ(app_url, bar_site_info.site_url());
EXPECT_EQ(bar_url.DeprecatedGetOriginAsURL(),
bar_site_info.process_lock_url());
EXPECT_EQ(foo_site_info.site_url(), bar_site_info.site_url());
// Navigate to foo_url and then to bar_url. Verify that we end up with
// correct SiteInfo in each case.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_site_instance =
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(foo_site_info, foo_site_instance->GetSiteInfo());
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), bar_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> bar_site_instance =
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(bar_site_info, bar_site_instance->GetSiteInfo());
// Verify that the SiteInstances and processes are different. In
// https://crbug.com/961386, we didn't swap processes for the second
// navigation, leading to renderer kills.
EXPECT_NE(foo_site_instance.get(), bar_site_instance.get());
EXPECT_NE(foo_site_instance->GetProcess(), bar_site_instance->GetProcess());
// Navigate to another site, then repeat this test with a redirect from
// foo.com to bar.com. The navigation should throw away the speculative RFH
// created for foo.com and should commit in a process locked to bar.com.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(
shell(), embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/title1.html")));
GURL redirect_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/server-redirect?" + bar_url.spec()));
modified_client.AddTranslation(redirect_url, app_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), redirect_url, bar_url));
EXPECT_EQ(bar_site_info, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteInfo());
}
// Check that navigating a main frame from an non-isolated origin to an
// isolated origin and vice versa swaps processes and uses a new SiteInstance,
// both for renderer-initiated and browser-initiated navigations.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, MainFrameNavigation) {
GURL unisolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), unisolated_url));
// Open a same-site popup to keep the www.foo.com process alive.
Shell* popup = OpenPopup(shell(), GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL), "foo");
SiteInstance* unisolated_instance =
popup->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
RenderProcessHost* unisolated_process =
popup->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
// Go to isolated.foo.com with a renderer-initiated navigation.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(web_contents(), isolated_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> isolated_instance =
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_process,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// The site URL for isolated.foo.com should be the full origin rather than
// scheme and eTLD+1.
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.foo.com/"), isolated_instance->GetSiteURL());
// Now use a renderer-initiated navigation to go to an unisolated origin,
// www.foo.com. This should end up back in the `popup`'s process.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(web_contents(), unisolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(unisolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(unisolated_process,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Now, perform a browser-initiated navigation to an isolated origin and
// ensure that this ends up in a new process and SiteInstance for
// isolated.foo.com.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(), unisolated_instance);
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
unisolated_process);
// Go back to www.foo.com: this should end up in the unisolated process.
{
TestNavigationObserver back_observer(web_contents());
web_contents()->GetController().GoBack();
back_observer.Wait();
}
EXPECT_EQ(unisolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(unisolated_process,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Go back again. This should go to isolated.foo.com in an isolated process.
{
TestNavigationObserver back_observer(web_contents());
web_contents()->GetController().GoBack();
back_observer.Wait();
}
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_process,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Do a renderer-initiated navigation from isolated.foo.com to another
// isolated origin and ensure there is a different isolated process.
GURL second_isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/title3.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(web_contents(), second_isolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.bar.com/"),
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
EXPECT_NE(isolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(unisolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
}
// Check that opening a popup for an isolated origin puts it into a new process
// and its own SiteInstance.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, Popup) {
GURL unisolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), unisolated_url));
// Open a popup to a URL with an isolated origin and ensure that there was a
// process swap.
Shell* popup = OpenPopup(shell(), isolated_url, "foo");
EXPECT_NE(shell()->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
popup->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
// The popup's site URL should match the full isolated origin.
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.foo.com/"),
popup->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
// Now open a second popup from an isolated origin to a URL with an
// unisolated origin and ensure that there was another process swap.
Shell* popup2 = OpenPopup(popup, unisolated_url, "bar");
EXPECT_EQ(shell()->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
popup2->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(popup->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
popup2->web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
}
// Check that navigating a subframe to an isolated origin puts the subframe
// into an OOPIF and its own SiteInstance. Also check that the isolated
// frame's subframes also end up in correct SiteInstance.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, Subframe) {
GURL top_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), top_url));
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com",
"/page_with_iframe.html"));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), isolated_url);
// Verify that the child frame is an OOPIF with a different SiteInstance.
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(child->current_frame_host()->IsCrossProcessSubframe());
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.foo.com/"),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
// Verify that the isolated frame's subframe (which starts out at a relative
// path) is kept in the isolated parent's SiteInstance.
FrameTreeNode* grandchild = child->child_at(0);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Navigating the grandchild to www.foo.com should put it into the top
// frame's SiteInstance.
GURL non_isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title3.html"));
TestFrameNavigationObserver observer(grandchild);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ExecJs(grandchild, "location.href = '" + non_isolated_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
EXPECT_EQ(non_isolated_url, grandchild->current_url());
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
// Check that when an non-isolated origin foo.com embeds a subframe from an
// isolated origin, which then navigates to a non-isolated origin bar.com,
// bar.com goes back to the main frame's SiteInstance. See
// https://crbug.com/711006.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
NoOOPIFWhenIsolatedOriginNavigatesToNonIsolatedOrigin) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL top_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), top_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com",
"/page_with_iframe.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_url, child->current_url());
// Verify that the child frame is an OOPIF with a different SiteInstance.
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(child->current_frame_host()->IsCrossProcessSubframe());
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.foo.com/"),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
// Navigate the child frame cross-site, but to a non-isolated origin. When
// strict SiteInstaces are not enabled, this should bring the subframe back
// into the main frame's SiteInstance. If strict SiteInstances are enabled,
// we expect the SiteInstances to be different because a SiteInstance is not
// allowed to contain multiple sites in that mode. In all cases though we
// expect the navigation to end up in the same process.
GURL bar_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(bar_url));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", bar_url);
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
EXPECT_EQ(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess());
}
// Check that a new isolated origin subframe will attempt to reuse an existing
// process for that isolated origin, even across BrowsingInstances. Also check
// that main frame navigations to an isolated origin keep using the default
// process model and do not reuse existing processes.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, SubframeReusesExistingProcess) {
GURL top_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), top_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
// Open an unrelated tab in a separate BrowsingInstance, and navigate it to
// to an isolated origin. This SiteInstance should have a default process
// reuse policy - only subframes attempt process reuse.
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com",
"/page_with_iframe.html"));
Shell* second_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(second_shell, isolated_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> second_shell_instance =
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(second_shell->web_contents()
->GetPrimaryMainFrame()
->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(second_shell_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()));
RenderProcessHost* isolated_process = second_shell_instance->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(SiteInstanceImpl::ProcessReusePolicy::DEFAULT,
second_shell_instance->process_reuse_policy());
// Now navigate the first tab's subframe to an isolated origin. See that it
// reuses the existing `isolated_process`.
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_url, child->current_url());
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_process, child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(
SiteInstanceImpl::ProcessReusePolicy::REUSE_PENDING_OR_COMMITTED_SITE,
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->process_reuse_policy());
EXPECT_TRUE(child->current_frame_host()->IsCrossProcessSubframe());
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.foo.com/"),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
// The subframe's SiteInstance should still be different from second_shell's
// SiteInstance, and they should be in separate BrowsingInstances.
EXPECT_NE(second_shell_instance,
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(second_shell_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()));
// Navigate the second tab to a normal URL with a same-site subframe. This
// leaves only the first tab's subframe in the isolated origin process.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(second_shell, top_url));
EXPECT_NE(isolated_process,
second_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Navigate the second tab's subframe to an isolated origin, and check that
// this new subframe reuses the isolated process of the subframe in the first
// tab, even though the two are in separate BrowsingInstances.
NavigateIframeToURL(second_shell->web_contents(), "test_iframe",
isolated_url);
FrameTreeNode* second_subframe =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(second_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root()
->child_at(0);
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_process,
second_subframe->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
second_subframe->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Open a third, unrelated tab, navigate it to an isolated origin, and check
// that its main frame doesn't share a process with the existing isolated
// subframes.
Shell* third_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(third_shell, isolated_url));
SiteInstanceImpl* third_shell_instance = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
third_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(third_shell_instance,
second_subframe->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(third_shell_instance,
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(third_shell_instance->GetProcess(), isolated_process);
}
// Check that when a cross-site, non-isolated-origin iframe opens a popup,
// navigates it to an isolated origin, and then the popup navigates back to its
// opener iframe's site, the popup and the opener iframe end up in the same
// process and can script each other. See https://crbug.com/796912.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
PopupNavigatesToIsolatedOriginAndBack) {
// Start on a page with same-site iframe.
GURL foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
// Navigate iframe cross-site, but not to an isolated origin. This should
// stay in the main frame's SiteInstance, unless we're in a strict
// SiteInstance mode (including --site-per-process). (Note that the bug for
// which this test is written is exclusive to --isolate-origins and does not
// happen with --site-per-process.)
GURL bar_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title1.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", bar_url);
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
// Open a blank popup from the iframe.
ShellAddedObserver new_shell_observer;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(child, "window.w = window.open();"));
Shell* new_shell = new_shell_observer.GetShell();
// Have the opener iframe navigate the popup to an isolated origin.
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
{
TestNavigationManager manager(new_shell->web_contents(), isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(
child, "window.w.location.href = '" + isolated_url.spec() + "';"));
ASSERT_TRUE(manager.WaitForNavigationFinished());
}
// Simulate the isolated origin in the popup navigating back to bar.com.
GURL bar_url2(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title2.html"));
{
TestNavigationManager manager(new_shell->web_contents(), bar_url2);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ExecJs(new_shell, "location.href = '" + bar_url2.spec() + "';"));
ASSERT_TRUE(manager.WaitForNavigationFinished());
}
// Check that the popup ended up in the same SiteInstance as its same-site
// opener iframe.
EXPECT_EQ(new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Check that the opener iframe can script the popup.
EXPECT_EQ(bar_url2.spec(), EvalJs(child, "window.w.location.href;"));
}
// Check that when a non-isolated-origin page opens a popup, navigates it
// to an isolated origin, and then the popup navigates to a third non-isolated
// origin and finally back to its opener's origin, the popup and the opener
// iframe end up in the same process and can script each other:
//
// foo.com
// |
// window.open()
// |
// V
// about:blank -> isolated.foo.com -> bar.com -> foo.com
//
// This is a variant of PopupNavigatesToIsolatedOriginAndBack where the popup
// navigates to a third site before coming back to the opener's site. See
// https://crbug.com/807184.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
PopupNavigatesToIsolatedOriginThenToAnotherSiteAndBack) {
// Start on www.foo.com.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
// Open a blank popup.
ShellAddedObserver new_shell_observer;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(root, "window.w = window.open();"));
Shell* new_shell = new_shell_observer.GetShell();
// Have the opener navigate the popup to an isolated origin.
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
{
TestNavigationManager manager(new_shell->web_contents(), isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(
root, "window.w.location.href = '" + isolated_url.spec() + "';"));
ASSERT_TRUE(manager.WaitForNavigationFinished());
}
// Simulate the isolated origin in the popup navigating to bar.com.
GURL bar_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title2.html"));
{
TestNavigationManager manager(new_shell->web_contents(), bar_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(new_shell, "location.href = '" + bar_url.spec() + "';"));
ASSERT_TRUE(manager.WaitForNavigationFinished());
}
const SiteInstanceImpl* const root_site_instance_impl =
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
const SiteInstanceImpl* const newshell_site_instance_impl =
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
if (AreDefaultSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
// When default SiteInstances are enabled, all sites that do not
// require a dedicated process all end up in the same default SiteInstance.
EXPECT_EQ(newshell_site_instance_impl, root_site_instance_impl);
EXPECT_TRUE(newshell_site_instance_impl->IsDefaultSiteInstance());
} else {
// At this point, the popup and the opener should still be in separate
// SiteInstances.
EXPECT_NE(newshell_site_instance_impl, root_site_instance_impl);
EXPECT_FALSE(newshell_site_instance_impl->IsDefaultSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(root_site_instance_impl->IsDefaultSiteInstance());
}
// Simulate the isolated origin in the popup navigating to www.foo.com.
{
TestNavigationManager manager(new_shell->web_contents(), foo_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(new_shell, "location.href = '" + foo_url.spec() + "';"));
ASSERT_TRUE(manager.WaitForNavigationFinished());
}
// The popup should now be in the same SiteInstance as its same-site opener.
EXPECT_EQ(new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance(),
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Check that the popup can script the opener.
EXPECT_EQ(foo_url.spec(), EvalJs(new_shell, "window.opener.location.href;"));
}
// Check that with an ABA hierarchy, where B is an isolated origin, the root
// and grandchild frames end up in the same process and can script each other.
// See https://crbug.com/796912.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
IsolatedOriginSubframeCreatesGrandchildInRootSite) {
// Start at foo.com and do a cross-site, renderer-initiated navigation to
// bar.com, which should stay in the same SiteInstance (outside of
// --site-per-process mode). This sets up the main frame such that its
// SiteInstance's site URL does not match its actual origin - a prerequisite
// for https://crbug.com/796912 to happen.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
GURL bar_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
TestNavigationObserver observer(web_contents());
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell(), "location.href = '" + bar_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
// Navigate bar.com's subframe to an isolated origin with its own subframe.
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com",
"/page_with_iframe.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_url, child->current_url());
FrameTreeNode* grandchild = child->child_at(0);
// Navigate the isolated origin's subframe back to bar.com, completing the
// ABA hierarchy.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(grandchild, bar_url));
// The root and grandchild should be in the same SiteInstance, and the
// middle child should be in a different SiteInstance.
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Check that the root frame can script the same-site grandchild frame.
EXPECT_EQ(bar_url.spec(), EvalJs(root, "frames[0][0].location.href;"));
}
// Check that isolated origins can access cookies. This requires cookie checks
// on the IO thread to be aware of isolated origins.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, Cookies) {
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(web_contents(), "document.cookie = 'foo=bar';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=bar", EvalJs(web_contents(), "document.cookie;"));
}
// Check that isolated origins won't be placed into processes for other sites
// when over the process limit.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, ProcessLimit) {
// Set the process limit to 1.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Navigate to an unisolated foo.com URL with an iframe.
GURL foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
RenderProcessHost* foo_process = root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
// Navigate iframe to an isolated origin.
GURL isolated_foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_foo_url);
// Ensure that the subframe was rendered in a new process.
EXPECT_NE(child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(), foo_process);
// Sanity-check IsSuitableHost values for the current processes.
const IsolationContext& isolation_context =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetIsolationContext();
auto is_suitable_host = [&isolation_context](RenderProcessHost* process,
const GURL& url) {
return RenderProcessHostImpl::IsSuitableHost(
process, isolation_context,
SiteInfo::CreateForTesting(isolation_context, url));
};
EXPECT_TRUE(is_suitable_host(foo_process, foo_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(is_suitable_host(foo_process, isolated_foo_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(is_suitable_host(child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
isolated_foo_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(
is_suitable_host(child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(), foo_url));
// Open a new, unrelated tab and navigate it to isolated.foo.com. This
// should use a new, unrelated SiteInstance that reuses the existing isolated
// origin process from first tab's subframe.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, isolated_foo_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> isolated_foo_instance(
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
RenderProcessHost* isolated_foo_process = isolated_foo_instance->GetProcess();
EXPECT_NE(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
isolated_foo_instance);
EXPECT_FALSE(isolated_foo_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()));
// TODO(alexmos): with --site-per-process, this won't currently reuse the
// subframe process, because the new SiteInstance will initialize its
// process while it still has no site (during CreateBrowser()), and since
// dedicated processes can't currently be reused for a SiteInstance with no
// site, this creates a new process. The subsequent navigation to
// `isolated_foo_url` stays in that new process without consulting whether it
// can now reuse a different process. This should be fixed; see
// https://crbug.com/513036. Without --site-per-process, this works because
// the site-less SiteInstance is allowed to reuse the first tab's foo.com
// process (which isn't dedicated), and then it swaps to the isolated.foo.com
// process during navigation.
if (!AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(), isolated_foo_process);
// Navigate iframe on the first tab to a non-isolated site. This should swap
// processes so that it does not reuse the isolated origin's process.
RenderFrameDeletedObserver deleted_observer(child->current_frame_host());
NavigateIframeToURL(
web_contents(), "test_iframe",
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_EQ(foo_process, child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(isolated_foo_process, child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
deleted_observer.WaitUntilDeleted();
// Navigate iframe back to isolated origin. See that it reuses the
// `new_shell` process.
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_foo_url);
EXPECT_NE(foo_process, child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_foo_process, child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Navigate iframe to a different isolated origin. Ensure that this creates
// a third process.
GURL isolated_bar_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/title3.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_bar_url);
RenderProcessHost* isolated_bar_process =
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_NE(foo_process, isolated_bar_process);
EXPECT_NE(isolated_foo_process, isolated_bar_process);
// The new process should only be suitable to host isolated.bar.com, not
// regular web URLs or other isolated origins.
EXPECT_TRUE(is_suitable_host(isolated_bar_process, isolated_bar_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(is_suitable_host(isolated_bar_process, foo_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(is_suitable_host(isolated_bar_process, isolated_foo_url));
// Navigate second tab (currently at isolated.foo.com) to the
// second isolated origin, and see that it switches processes.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, isolated_bar_url));
EXPECT_NE(foo_process,
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(isolated_foo_process,
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_bar_process,
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Navigate second tab to a non-isolated URL and see that it goes back into
// the www.foo.com process, and that it does not share processes with any
// isolated origins.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, foo_url));
EXPECT_EQ(foo_process,
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(isolated_foo_process,
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(isolated_bar_process,
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
}
// Verify that a navigation to an non-isolated origin does not reuse a process
// from a pending navigation to an isolated origin. See
// https://crbug.com/738634.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
ProcessReuseWithResponseStartedFromIsolatedOrigin) {
// Set the process limit to 1.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Start, but don't commit a navigation to an unisolated foo.com URL.
GURL slow_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
NavigationController::LoadURLParams load_params(slow_url);
TestNavigationManager foo_delayer(shell()->web_contents(), slow_url);
shell()->web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(
slow_url, Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, std::string());
EXPECT_TRUE(foo_delayer.WaitForRequestStart());
// Open a new, unrelated tab and navigate it to isolated.foo.com.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
TestNavigationManager isolated_delayer(new_shell->web_contents(),
isolated_url);
new_shell->web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(
isolated_url, Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, std::string());
// Wait for the response from the isolated origin. After this returns, we made
// the final pick for the process to use for this navigation as part of
// NavigationRequest::OnResponseStarted.
EXPECT_TRUE(isolated_delayer.WaitForResponse());
// Now, proceed with the response and commit the non-isolated URL. This
// should notice that the process that was picked for this navigation is not
// suitable anymore, as it should have been locked to isolated.foo.com.
ASSERT_TRUE(foo_delayer.WaitForNavigationFinished());
// Commit the isolated origin.
ASSERT_TRUE(isolated_delayer.WaitForNavigationFinished());
// Ensure that the isolated origin did not share a process with the first
// tab.
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
}
// When a navigation uses a siteless SiteInstance, and a second navigation
// commits an isolated origin which reuses the siteless SiteInstance's process
// before the first navigation's response is received, ensure that the first
// navigation can still finish properly and transfer to a new process, without
// an origin lock mismatch. See https://crbug.com/773809.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
ProcessReuseWithLazilyAssignedSiteInstance) {
// Set the process limit to 1.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Start from an about:blank page, where the SiteInstance will not have a
// site assigned, but will have an associated process.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)));
SiteInstanceImpl* starting_site_instance = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(starting_site_instance->HasSite());
EXPECT_TRUE(starting_site_instance->HasProcess());
// Inject and click a link to a non-isolated origin www.foo.com. Note that
// setting location.href won't work here, as that goes through OpenURL
// instead of OnBeginNavigation when starting from an about:blank page, and
// that doesn't trigger this bug.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
TestNavigationManager manager(shell()->web_contents(), foo_url);
InjectAndClickLinkTo(foo_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(manager.WaitForRequestStart());
// Before response is received, open a new, unrelated tab and navigate it to
// isolated.foo.com. This reuses the first process, which is still considered
// unused at this point, and locks it to isolated.foo.com.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, isolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Wait for response from the first tab. This should notice that the first
// process is no longer suitable for the final destination (which is an
// unisolated URL) and transfer to another process. In
// https://crbug.com/773809, this led to a CHECK due to origin lock mismatch.
ASSERT_TRUE(manager.WaitForNavigationFinished());
// Ensure that the isolated origin did not share a process with the first
// tab.
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
}
// Same as ProcessReuseWithLazilyAssignedSiteInstance above, but here the
// navigation with a siteless SiteInstance is for an isolated origin, and the
// unrelated tab loads an unisolated URL which reuses the siteless
// SiteInstance's process. Although the unisolated URL won't lock that process
// to an origin (except when running with --site-per-process), it should still
// mark it as used and cause the isolated origin to transfer when it receives a
// response. See https://crbug.com/773809.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
ProcessReuseWithLazilyAssignedIsolatedSiteInstance) {
// Set the process limit to 1.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Start from an about:blank page, where the SiteInstance will not have a
// site assigned, but will have an associated process.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)));
SiteInstanceImpl* starting_site_instance = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(starting_site_instance->HasSite());
EXPECT_TRUE(starting_site_instance->HasProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->IsUnused());
// Inject and click a link to an isolated origin. Note that
// setting location.href won't work here, as that goes through OpenURL
// instead of OnBeginNavigation when starting from an about:blank page, and
// that doesn't trigger this bug.
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
TestNavigationManager manager(shell()->web_contents(), isolated_url);
InjectAndClickLinkTo(isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(manager.WaitForRequestStart());
// Before response is received, open a new, unrelated tab and navigate it to
// an unisolated URL. This should reuse the first process, which is still
// considered unused at this point, and marks it as used.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, foo_url));
EXPECT_EQ(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_FALSE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->IsUnused());
// Wait for response in the first tab. This should notice that the first
// process is no longer suitable for the isolated origin because it should
// already be marked as used, and transfer to another process.
ASSERT_TRUE(manager.WaitForNavigationFinished());
// Ensure that the isolated origin did not share a process with the second
// tab.
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
}
// Verify that a navigation to an unisolated origin cannot reuse a process from
// a pending navigation to an isolated origin. Similar to
// ProcessReuseWithResponseStartedFromIsolatedOrigin, but here the non-isolated
// URL is the first to reach OnResponseStarted, which should mark the process
// as "used", so that the isolated origin can't reuse it. See
// https://crbug.com/738634.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
ProcessReuseWithResponseStartedFromUnisolatedOrigin) {
// Set the process limit to 1.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Start a navigation to an unisolated foo.com URL.
GURL slow_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
NavigationController::LoadURLParams load_params(slow_url);
TestNavigationManager foo_delayer(shell()->web_contents(), slow_url);
shell()->web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(
slow_url, Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, std::string());
// Wait for the response for foo.com. After this returns, we should have made
// the final pick for the process to use for foo.com, so this should mark the
// process as "used" and ineligible for reuse by isolated.foo.com below.
EXPECT_TRUE(foo_delayer.WaitForResponse());
// Open a new, unrelated tab, navigate it to isolated.foo.com, and wait for
// the navigation to fully load.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, isolated_url));
// Finish loading the foo.com URL.
ASSERT_TRUE(foo_delayer.WaitForNavigationFinished());
// Ensure that the isolated origin did not share a process with the first
// tab.
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
}
// Verify that when a process has a pending SiteProcessCountTracker entry for
// an isolated origin, and a navigation to a non-isolated origin reuses that
// process, future isolated origin subframe navigations do not reuse that
// process. See https://crbug.com/780661.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(
IsolatedOriginTest,
IsolatedSubframeDoesNotReuseUnsuitableProcessWithPendingSiteEntry) {
// Set the process limit to 1.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Start from an about:blank page, where the SiteInstance will not have a
// site assigned, but will have an associated process.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)));
EXPECT_TRUE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->IsUnused());
// Inject and click a link to an isolated origin URL which never sends back a
// response.
GURL hung_isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/hung"));
TestNavigationManager manager(web_contents(), hung_isolated_url);
InjectAndClickLinkTo(hung_isolated_url);
// Wait for the request and send it. This will place
// isolated.foo.com on the list of pending sites for this tab's process.
EXPECT_TRUE(manager.WaitForRequestStart());
manager.ResumeNavigation();
// Open a new, unrelated tab and navigate it to an unisolated URL. This
// should reuse the first process, which is still considered unused at this
// point, and mark it as used.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
GURL foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, foo_url));
// Navigate iframe on second tab to isolated.foo.com. This should *not*
// reuse the first process, even though isolated.foo.com is still in its list
// of pending sites (from the hung navigation in the first tab). That
// process is unsuitable because it now contains www.foo.com.
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(new_shell->web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_url);
FrameTreeNode* root = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(new_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_NE(child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Manipulating cookies from the main frame should not result in a renderer
// kill.
EXPECT_TRUE(
ExecJs(root->current_frame_host(), "document.cookie = 'foo=bar';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=bar", EvalJs(root->current_frame_host(), "document.cookie;"));
}
// Similar to the test above, but for a ServiceWorker. When a process has a
// pending SiteProcessCountTracker entry for an isolated origin, and a
// navigation to a non-isolated origin reuses that process, a ServiceWorker
// subsequently created for that isolated origin shouldn't reuse that process.
// See https://crbug.com/780661 and https://crbug.com/780089.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(
IsolatedOriginTest,
IsolatedServiceWorkerDoesNotReuseUnsuitableProcessWithPendingSiteEntry) {
// Set the process limit to 1.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Start from an about:blank page, where the SiteInstance will not have a
// site assigned, but will have an associated process.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)));
EXPECT_TRUE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->IsUnused());
// Inject and click a link to an isolated origin URL which never sends back a
// response.
GURL hung_isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/hung"));
TestNavigationManager manager(shell()->web_contents(), hung_isolated_url);
InjectAndClickLinkTo(hung_isolated_url);
// Wait for the request and send it. This will place
// isolated.foo.com on the list of pending sites for this tab's process.
EXPECT_TRUE(manager.WaitForRequestStart());
manager.ResumeNavigation();
// Open a new, unrelated tab and navigate it to an unisolated URL. This
// should reuse the first process, which is still considered unused at this
// point, and mark it as used.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, foo_url));
// A SiteInstance created for an isolated origin ServiceWorker should
// not reuse the unsuitable first process.
BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> sw_site_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForServiceWorker(
browser_context,
UrlInfo::CreateForTesting(
hung_isolated_url,
StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(browser_context)),
/* can_reuse_process= */ true);
RenderProcessHost* sw_host = sw_site_instance->GetProcess();
EXPECT_NE(new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
sw_host);
// Cancel the hung request and commit a real navigation to an isolated
// origin. This should now end up in the ServiceWorker's process.
web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root()->ResetNavigationRequest(
NavigationDiscardReason::kCancelled);
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(), sw_host);
}
// Check that subdomains on an isolated origin (e.g., bar.isolated.foo.com)
// also end up in the isolated origin's SiteInstance.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, IsolatedOriginWithSubdomain) {
// Start on a page with an isolated origin with a same-site iframe.
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com",
"/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> isolated_instance =
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance();
// Navigate iframe to the isolated origin's subdomain.
GURL isolated_subdomain_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_subdomain_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), isolated_subdomain_url);
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_instance, child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(child->current_frame_host()->IsCrossProcessSubframe());
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.foo.com/"),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
// Now try navigating the main frame (renderer-initiated) to the isolated
// origin's subdomain. This should not swap processes.
TestNavigationObserver observer(web_contents());
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(web_contents(), "location.href = '" +
isolated_subdomain_url.spec() + "'"));
observer.Wait();
if (CanSameSiteMainFrameNavigationsChangeSiteInstances()) {
// If same-site ProactivelySwapBrowsingInstance is enabled, they should be
// in different site instances but in the same process.
EXPECT_NE(isolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_instance->GetProcess(),
web_contents()->GetSiteInstance()->GetProcess());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_instance, web_contents()->GetSiteInstance());
}
}
// This class allows intercepting the BindStorageArea and OpenLocalStorage
// methods in order to test what happens when parameters are changed.
class StoragePartitonInterceptor
: public blink::mojom::DomStorageInterceptorForTesting,
public RenderProcessHostObserver {
public:
StoragePartitonInterceptor(
RenderProcessHostImpl* rph,
mojo::PendingReceiver<blink::mojom::DomStorage> receiver,
absl::optional<blink::StorageKey> storage_key_to_inject,
absl::optional<blink::LocalFrameToken> local_frame_token_to_inject,
bool inject_first_local_frame_token)
: storage_key_to_inject_(storage_key_to_inject),
local_frame_token_to_inject_(local_frame_token_to_inject),
save_first_local_frame_token_(inject_first_local_frame_token) {
StoragePartitionImpl* storage_partition =
static_cast<StoragePartitionImpl*>(rph->GetStoragePartition());
// Bind the real DomStorage implementation.
mojo::PendingRemote<blink::mojom::DomStorageClient> unused_client;
std::ignore = unused_client.InitWithNewPipeAndPassReceiver();
mojo::ReceiverId receiver_id = storage_partition->BindDomStorage(
rph->GetID(), std::move(receiver), std::move(unused_client));
// Now replace it with this object and keep a pointer to the real
// implementation.
dom_storage_ = storage_partition->dom_storage_receivers_for_testing()
.SwapImplForTesting(receiver_id, this);
// Register the `this` as a RenderProcessHostObserver, so it can be
// correctly cleaned up when the process exits.
rph->AddObserver(this);
}
StoragePartitonInterceptor(const StoragePartitonInterceptor&) = delete;
StoragePartitonInterceptor& operator=(const StoragePartitonInterceptor&) =
delete;
// Ensure this object is cleaned up when the process goes away, since it
// is not owned by anyone else.
void RenderProcessExited(RenderProcessHost* host,
const ChildProcessTerminationInfo& info) override {
host->RemoveObserver(this);
delete this;
}
// Allow all methods that aren't explicitly overridden to pass through
// unmodified.
blink::mojom::DomStorage* GetForwardingInterface() override {
return dom_storage_;
}
// Override this method to allow changing the `storage_key` or
// `local_frame_token`. It simulates a renderer process sending incorrect
// data to the browser process, so security checks can be tested.
void OpenLocalStorage(
const blink::StorageKey& storage_key,
const blink::LocalFrameToken& local_frame_token,
mojo::PendingReceiver<blink::mojom::StorageArea> receiver) override {
if (save_first_local_frame_token_ && !saved_first_local_frame_token_)
saved_first_local_frame_token_ = local_frame_token;
if (saved_first_local_frame_token_ && !local_frame_token_to_inject_)
local_frame_token_to_inject_ = saved_first_local_frame_token_;
GetForwardingInterface()->OpenLocalStorage(
storage_key_to_inject_ ? *storage_key_to_inject_ : storage_key,
local_frame_token_to_inject_ ? *local_frame_token_to_inject_
: local_frame_token,
std::move(receiver));
}
// Override this method to allow changing the `storage_key`. It simulates a
// renderer process sending incorrect data to the browser process, so
// security checks can be tested.
void BindSessionStorageArea(
const blink::StorageKey& storage_key,
const blink::LocalFrameToken& local_frame_token,
const std::string& namespace_id,
mojo::PendingReceiver<blink::mojom::StorageArea> receiver) override {
if (save_first_local_frame_token_ && !saved_first_local_frame_token_)
saved_first_local_frame_token_ = local_frame_token;
if (saved_first_local_frame_token_ && !local_frame_token_to_inject_)
local_frame_token_to_inject_ = saved_first_local_frame_token_;
GetForwardingInterface()->BindSessionStorageArea(
storage_key_to_inject_ ? *storage_key_to_inject_ : storage_key,
local_frame_token_to_inject_ ? *local_frame_token_to_inject_
: local_frame_token,
namespace_id, std::move(receiver));
}
private:
static absl::optional<blink::LocalFrameToken> saved_first_local_frame_token_;
// Keep a pointer to the original implementation of the service, so all
// calls can be forwarded to it.
raw_ptr<blink::mojom::DomStorage> dom_storage_;
absl::optional<blink::StorageKey> storage_key_to_inject_;
absl::optional<blink::LocalFrameToken> local_frame_token_to_inject_;
bool save_first_local_frame_token_;
};
absl::optional<blink::LocalFrameToken>
StoragePartitonInterceptor::saved_first_local_frame_token_ = absl::nullopt;
// Save the first LocalFrameToken seen and inject it into future calls.
void CreateTestDomStorageBackendToSaveFirstFrame(
RenderProcessHostImpl* rph,
mojo::PendingReceiver<blink::mojom::DomStorage> receiver) {
// This object will register as RenderProcessHostObserver, so it will
// clean itself automatically on process exit.
new StoragePartitonInterceptor(rph, std::move(receiver), absl::nullopt,
absl::nullopt,
/* save_first_local_frame_token_ */ true);
}
// Inject (or not if null) a StorageKey and LocalFrameToken.
void CreateTestDomStorageBackendToInjectValues(
absl::optional<blink::StorageKey> storage_key_to_inject,
absl::optional<blink::LocalFrameToken> local_frame_token_to_inject,
RenderProcessHostImpl* rph,
mojo::PendingReceiver<blink::mojom::DomStorage> receiver) {
// This object will register as RenderProcessHostObserver, so it will
// clean itself automatically on process exit.
new StoragePartitonInterceptor(rph, std::move(receiver),
storage_key_to_inject,
local_frame_token_to_inject,
/* save_first_local_frame_token_ */ false);
}
// Verify that a renderer process cannot read sessionStorage of another origin.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, SessionStorage_WrongOrigin) {
auto mismatched_storage_key =
blink::StorageKey::CreateFromStringForTesting("http://bar.com");
RenderProcessHostImpl::SetDomStorageBinderForTesting(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateTestDomStorageBackendToInjectValues,
mismatched_storage_key, absl::nullopt));
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(isolated_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
content::RenderProcessHostBadIpcMessageWaiter kill_waiter(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Use std::ignore here, since on Android the renderer process is
// terminated, but ExecJs still returns true. It properly returns
// false on all other platforms.
std::ignore =
ExecJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), "sessionStorage.length;");
EXPECT_EQ(bad_message::RPH_MOJO_PROCESS_ERROR, kill_waiter.Wait());
}
// Verify not fatal if the renderer reads sessionStorage from an empty
// LocalFrameToken.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
SessionStorage_EmptyLocalFrameToken) {
// This sets up some initial sessionStorage state for the subsequent test.
GURL page_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), page_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"sessionStorage.setItem('key', 'value');"));
EXPECT_EQ(1, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"sessionStorage.length"));
// Set up the IPC injection and crash the renderer process so that it's used.
// Without crashing the renderer, the default IPC will be used.
RenderProcessHostImpl::SetDomStorageBinderForTesting(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateTestDomStorageBackendToInjectValues,
absl::nullopt, blink::LocalFrameToken()));
RenderProcessHost* renderer_process =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
RenderProcessHostWatcher crash_observer(
renderer_process, RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
renderer_process->Shutdown(0);
crash_observer.Wait();
// Re-do tests now that injection is in place
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), page_url));
EXPECT_EQ(0, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"sessionStorage.length"));
}
// Verify fatal error if the renderer reads sessionStorage from the wrong
// LocalFrameToken.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
SessionStorage_WrongLocalFrameToken) {
// This sets up some initial sessionStorage state for the subsequent test.
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"isolated.foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?isolated.foo.com(bar.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"sessionStorage.setItem('key', 'value');"));
EXPECT_EQ(1, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"sessionStorage.length"));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0),
"sessionStorage.setItem('key', 'value');"));
EXPECT_EQ(1, EvalJs(ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0), "sessionStorage.length"));
// Set up the IPC injection and crash the renderer process so that it's used.
// Without crashing the renderer, the default IPC will be used.
RenderProcessHostImpl::SetDomStorageBinderForTesting(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateTestDomStorageBackendToSaveFirstFrame));
RenderProcessHost* renderer_process_iframe =
ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0)->GetProcess();
RenderProcessHostWatcher crash_observer_iframe(
renderer_process_iframe,
RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
renderer_process_iframe->Shutdown(0);
crash_observer_iframe.Wait();
RenderProcessHost* renderer_process_root =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
RenderProcessHostWatcher crash_observer_root(
renderer_process_root, RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
renderer_process_root->Shutdown(0);
crash_observer_root.Wait();
// Re-do tests now that injection is in place
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(1, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"sessionStorage.length"));
content::RenderProcessHostBadIpcMessageWaiter kill_waiter(
ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0)->GetProcess());
std::ignore = ExecJs(ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0), "sessionStorage.length");
EXPECT_EQ(bad_message::RPH_MOJO_PROCESS_ERROR, kill_waiter.Wait());
// The subframe has crashed, but the main frame should still be alive and
// working.
EXPECT_EQ(1, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"sessionStorage.length"));
}
// Verify not fatal if the renderer reads localStorage from an empty
// LocalFrameToken.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, LocalStorage_EmptyLocalFrameToken) {
// This sets up some initial localStorage state for the subsequent test.
GURL page_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), page_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"localStorage.setItem('key', 'value');"));
EXPECT_EQ(
1, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), "localStorage.length"));
// Set up the IPC injection and crash the renderer process so that it's used.
// Without crashing the renderer, the default IPC will be used.
RenderProcessHostImpl::SetDomStorageBinderForTesting(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateTestDomStorageBackendToInjectValues,
absl::nullopt, blink::LocalFrameToken()));
RenderProcessHost* renderer_process =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
RenderProcessHostWatcher crash_observer(
renderer_process, RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
renderer_process->Shutdown(0);
crash_observer.Wait();
// Re-do tests now that injection is in place
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), page_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
0, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), "localStorage.length"));
}
// Verify fatal error if the renderer reads localStorage from the wrong
// LocalFrameToken.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, LocalStorage_WrongLocalFrameToken) {
// This sets up some initial localStorage state for the subsequent test.
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"isolated.foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?isolated.foo.com(bar.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"localStorage.setItem('key', 'value');"));
EXPECT_EQ(
1, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), "localStorage.length"));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0),
"localStorage.setItem('key', 'value');"));
EXPECT_EQ(1, EvalJs(ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0), "localStorage.length"));
// Set up the IPC injection and crash the renderer process so that it's used.
// Without crashing the renderer, the default IPC will be used.
RenderProcessHostImpl::SetDomStorageBinderForTesting(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateTestDomStorageBackendToSaveFirstFrame));
RenderProcessHost* renderer_process_iframe =
ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0)->GetProcess();
RenderProcessHostWatcher crash_observer_iframe(
renderer_process_iframe,
RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
renderer_process_iframe->Shutdown(0);
crash_observer_iframe.Wait();
RenderProcessHost* renderer_process_root =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
RenderProcessHostWatcher crash_observer_root(
renderer_process_root, RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
renderer_process_root->Shutdown(0);
crash_observer_root.Wait();
// Re-do tests now that injection is in place
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
1, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), "localStorage.length"));
content::RenderProcessHostBadIpcMessageWaiter kill_waiter(
ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0)->GetProcess());
std::ignore = ExecJs(ChildFrameAt(shell(), 0), "localStorage.length");
EXPECT_EQ(bad_message::RPH_MOJO_PROCESS_ERROR, kill_waiter.Wait());
// The subframe has crashed, but the main frame should still be alive and
// working.
EXPECT_EQ(
1, EvalJs(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(), "localStorage.length"));
}
// Verify that an isolated renderer process cannot read localStorage of an
// origin outside of its isolated site.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(
IsolatedOriginTest,
LocalStorageOriginEnforcement_IsolatedAccessingNonIsolated) {
auto mismatched_storage_key =
blink::StorageKey::CreateFromStringForTesting("http://abc.foo.com");
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(mismatched_storage_key.origin()));
RenderProcessHostImpl::SetDomStorageBinderForTesting(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateTestDomStorageBackendToInjectValues,
mismatched_storage_key, absl::nullopt));
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(isolated_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
content::RenderProcessHostBadIpcMessageWaiter kill_waiter(
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Use std::ignore here, since on Android the renderer process is
// terminated, but ExecJs still returns true. It properly returns
// false on all other platforms.
std::ignore = ExecJs(shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"localStorage.length;");
EXPECT_EQ(bad_message::RPH_MOJO_PROCESS_ERROR, kill_waiter.Wait());
}
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_LocalStorageOriginEnforcement_NonIsolatedAccessingIsolated \
LocalStorageOriginEnforcement_NonIsolatedAccessingIsolated
#else
// TODO(lukasza): https://crbug.com/566091: Once remote NTP is capable of
// embedding OOPIFs, start enforcing citadel-style checks on desktop
// platforms.
#define MAYBE_LocalStorageOriginEnforcement_NonIsolatedAccessingIsolated \
DISABLED_LocalStorageOriginEnforcement_NonIsolatedAccessingIsolated
#endif
// Verify that a non-isolated renderer process cannot read localStorage of an
// isolated origin.
//
// TODO(alexmos, lukasza): https://crbug.com/764958: Replicate this test for
// the IO-thread case.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(
IsolatedOriginTest,
MAYBE_LocalStorageOriginEnforcement_NonIsolatedAccessingIsolated) {
auto isolated_storage_key =
blink::StorageKey::CreateFromStringForTesting("http://isolated.foo.com");
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(isolated_storage_key.origin()));
GURL nonisolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("non-isolated.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(nonisolated_url)));
RenderProcessHostImpl::SetDomStorageBinderForTesting(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateTestDomStorageBackendToInjectValues,
isolated_storage_key, absl::nullopt));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), nonisolated_url));
content::RenderProcessHostBadIpcMessageWaiter kill_waiter(
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Use std::ignore here, since on Android the renderer process is
// terminated, but ExecJs still returns true. It properly returns
// false on all other platforms.
std::ignore = ExecJs(shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"localStorage.length;");
EXPECT_EQ(bad_message::RPH_MOJO_PROCESS_ERROR, kill_waiter.Wait());
}
// Verify that an IPC request for reading localStorage of an *opaque* origin
// will be rejected.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest,
LocalStorageOriginEnforcement_OpaqueOrigin) {
url::Origin precursor_origin =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://non-isolated.com"));
const blink::StorageKey opaque_storage_key =
blink::StorageKey::CreateFirstParty(
precursor_origin.DeriveNewOpaqueOrigin());
RenderProcessHostImpl::SetDomStorageBinderForTesting(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateTestDomStorageBackendToInjectValues,
opaque_storage_key, absl::nullopt));
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(isolated_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
content::RenderProcessHostBadIpcMessageWaiter kill_waiter(
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
// Use std::ignore here, since on Android the renderer process is
// terminated, but ExecJs still returns true. It properly returns
// false on all other platforms.
std::ignore = ExecJs(shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"localStorage.length;");
EXPECT_EQ(bad_message::RPH_MOJO_PROCESS_ERROR, kill_waiter.Wait());
}
class IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest : public IsolatedOriginTestBase {
public:
IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeatureWithParameters(
features::kIsolateOrigins,
{{features::kIsolateOriginsFieldTrialParamName,
"https://field.trial.com/,https://bar.com/"}});
}
~IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest() override = default;
IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest(const IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest&) = delete;
IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest& operator=(const IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest&) =
delete;
private:
base::test::ScopedFeatureList scoped_feature_list_;
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest, Test) {
bool expected_to_isolate = !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_to_isolate,
IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://field.trial.com/")));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_to_isolate, IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://bar.com/")));
}
class IsolatedOriginCommandLineAndFieldTrialTest
: public IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest {
public:
IsolatedOriginCommandLineAndFieldTrialTest() = default;
IsolatedOriginCommandLineAndFieldTrialTest(
const IsolatedOriginCommandLineAndFieldTrialTest&) = delete;
IsolatedOriginCommandLineAndFieldTrialTest& operator=(
const IsolatedOriginCommandLineAndFieldTrialTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kIsolateOrigins,
"https://cmd.line.com/,https://cmdline.com/");
}
};
// Verify that the lists of isolated origins specified via --isolate-origins
// and via field trials are merged. See https://crbug.com/894535.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginCommandLineAndFieldTrialTest, Test) {
// --isolate-origins should take effect regardless of the
// kDisableSiteIsolation opt-out flag.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://cmd.line.com/")));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://cmdline.com/")));
// Field trial origins should also take effect, but only if the opt-out flag
// is not present.
bool expected_to_isolate = !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_to_isolate,
IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://field.trial.com/")));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_to_isolate, IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://bar.com/")));
}
// This is a regression test for https://crbug.com/793350 - the long list of
// origins to isolate used to be unnecessarily propagated to the renderer
// process, trigerring a crash due to exceeding kZygoteMaxMessageLength.
class IsolatedOriginLongListTest : public IsolatedOriginTestBase {
public:
IsolatedOriginLongListTest() = default;
~IsolatedOriginLongListTest() override = default;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen());
std::ostringstream origin_list;
origin_list
<< embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/").spec();
for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
std::ostringstream hostname;
hostname << "foo" << i << ".com";
origin_list << ","
<< embedded_test_server()->GetURL(hostname.str(), "/").spec();
}
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kIsolateOrigins,
origin_list.str());
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
embedded_test_server()->StartAcceptingConnections();
}
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginLongListTest, Test) {
GURL test_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"bar1.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"bar1.com(isolated.foo.com,foo999.com,bar2.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), test_url));
EXPECT_EQ(4u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
RenderFrameHost* main_frame = shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame();
RenderFrameHost* subframe1 = ChildFrameAt(main_frame, 0);
RenderFrameHost* subframe2 = ChildFrameAt(main_frame, 1);
RenderFrameHost* subframe3 = ChildFrameAt(main_frame, 2);
EXPECT_EQ("bar1.com", main_frame->GetLastCommittedOrigin().GetURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("isolated.foo.com",
subframe1->GetLastCommittedOrigin().GetURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("foo999.com", subframe2->GetLastCommittedOrigin().GetURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("bar2.com", subframe3->GetLastCommittedOrigin().GetURL().host());
// bar1.com and bar2.com are not on the list of origins to isolate - they
// should stay in the same process, unless --site-per-process has also been
// specified.
if (!AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
EXPECT_EQ(main_frame->GetProcess()->GetID(),
subframe3->GetProcess()->GetID());
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(main_frame->GetSiteInstance(), subframe3->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(main_frame->GetSiteInstance(), subframe3->GetSiteInstance());
}
}
// isolated.foo.com and foo999.com are on the list of origins to isolate -
// they should be isolated from everything else.
EXPECT_NE(main_frame->GetProcess()->GetID(),
subframe1->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(main_frame->GetSiteInstance(), subframe1->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(main_frame->GetProcess()->GetID(),
subframe2->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(main_frame->GetSiteInstance(), subframe2->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(subframe1->GetProcess()->GetID(), subframe2->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(subframe1->GetSiteInstance(), subframe2->GetSiteInstance());
}
// Check that navigating a subframe to an isolated origin error page puts the
// subframe into an OOPIF and its own SiteInstance. Also check that the error
// page in a subframe ends up in the correct SiteInstance.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, SubframeErrorPages) {
GURL top_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("/frame_tree/page_with_two_frames.html"));
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/close-socket"));
GURL regular_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/close-socket"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), top_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
EXPECT_EQ(2u, root->child_count());
FrameTreeNode* child1 = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child2 = root->child_at(1);
{
TestFrameNavigationObserver observer(child1);
NavigationHandleObserver handle_observer(web_contents(), isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ExecJs(child1, "location.href = '" + isolated_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
EXPECT_EQ(child1->current_url(), isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(handle_observer.is_error());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
/*in_main_frame=*/false)) {
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.foo.com/"),
child1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(child1->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.is_error_page());
}
}
{
TestFrameNavigationObserver observer(child2);
NavigationHandleObserver handle_observer(web_contents(), regular_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ExecJs(child2, "location.href = '" + regular_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
EXPECT_EQ(child2->current_url(), regular_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(handle_observer.is_error());
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
/*in_main_frame=*/false)) {
EXPECT_EQ(
SiteInfo::CreateForTesting(
IsolationContext(web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()),
regular_url),
child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteInfo());
}
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
EXPECT_EQ(SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
/*in_main_frame=*/false),
child2->current_frame_host()
->GetSiteInstance()
->GetSiteInfo()
.is_error_page());
}
}
namespace {
bool HasDefaultSiteInstance(RenderFrameHost* rfh) {
return static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance())
->IsDefaultSiteInstance();
}
} // namespace
// Verify process assignment behavior for the case where a site that does not
// require isolation embeds a frame that does require isolation, which in turn
// embeds another site that does not require isolation.
// A (Does not require isolation)
// +-> B (requires isolation)
// +-> C (different site from A that does not require isolation.)
// +-> A (same site as top-level which also does not require isolation.)
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, AIsolatedCA) {
GURL main_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?www.foo."
"com(isolated.foo.com(c(www.foo.com)))"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), main_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
RenderFrameHost* a = root->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* b = root->child_at(0)->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* c = root->child_at(0)->child_at(0)->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* d =
root->child_at(0)->child_at(0)->child_at(0)->current_frame_host();
// Sanity check that the test works with the right frame tree.
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(a->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(b->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(c->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(d->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_EQ("www.foo.com", a->GetLastCommittedURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("isolated.foo.com", b->GetLastCommittedURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("c.com", c->GetLastCommittedURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("www.foo.com", d->GetLastCommittedURL().host());
// Verify that the isolated site is indeed isolated.
EXPECT_NE(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), a->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), c->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), d->GetProcess()->GetID());
// Verify that same-origin a and d frames share a process. This is
// necessary for correctness - otherwise a and d wouldn't be able to
// synchronously script each other.
EXPECT_EQ(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), d->GetProcess()->GetID());
// Verify that same-origin a and d frames can script each other.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(a, "window.name = 'a';"));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(d, R"(
a = window.open('', 'a');
a.cross_frame_property_test = 'hello from d'; )"));
EXPECT_EQ("hello from d",
EvalJs(a, "window.cross_frame_property_test").ExtractString());
// The test assertions below are not strictly necessary - they just document
// the current behavior. In particular, consolidating www.foo.com and c.com
// sites into the same process is not necessary for correctness.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
// All sites are isolated so we expect foo.com, isolated.foo.com and c.com
// to all be in their own processes.
EXPECT_NE(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), b->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), c->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), c->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetSiteInstance(), b->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetSiteInstance(), c->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(a->GetSiteInstance(), d->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(b->GetSiteInstance(), c->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(HasDefaultSiteInstance(a));
EXPECT_FALSE(HasDefaultSiteInstance(b));
EXPECT_FALSE(HasDefaultSiteInstance(c));
} else if (AreDefaultSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
// All sites that are not isolated should be in the same default
// SiteInstance process.
EXPECT_NE(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), b->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), c->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetSiteInstance(), b->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(a->GetSiteInstance(), c->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(a->GetSiteInstance(), d->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(b->GetSiteInstance(), c->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(HasDefaultSiteInstance(a));
EXPECT_FALSE(HasDefaultSiteInstance(b));
} else if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
// All sites have their own SiteInstance and sites that are not isolated
// are all placed in the same process.
EXPECT_NE(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), b->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), c->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetSiteInstance(), b->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetSiteInstance(), c->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(a->GetSiteInstance(), d->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(b->GetSiteInstance(), c->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(HasDefaultSiteInstance(a));
EXPECT_FALSE(HasDefaultSiteInstance(b));
EXPECT_FALSE(HasDefaultSiteInstance(c));
} else {
FAIL() << "Unexpected process model configuration.";
}
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTest, NavigateToBlobURL) {
GURL top_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), top_url));
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com",
"/page_with_iframe.html"));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(child->current_frame_host()->IsCrossProcessSubframe());
// Now navigate the child frame to a Blob URL.
TestNavigationObserver load_observer(shell()->web_contents());
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame(),
"const b = new Blob(['foo']);\n"
"const u = URL.createObjectURL(b);\n"
"frames[0].location = u;\n"
"URL.revokeObjectURL(u);"));
load_observer.Wait();
EXPECT_TRUE(base::StartsWith(child->current_url().spec(),
"blob:http://www.foo.com",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE));
EXPECT_TRUE(load_observer.last_navigation_succeeded());
}
// Ensure that --disable-site-isolation-trials disables origin isolation.
class IsolatedOriginTrialOverrideTest : public IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest {
public:
IsolatedOriginTrialOverrideTest() = default;
~IsolatedOriginTrialOverrideTest() override = default;
IsolatedOriginTrialOverrideTest(const IsolatedOriginTrialOverrideTest&) =
delete;
IsolatedOriginTrialOverrideTest& operator=(
const IsolatedOriginTrialOverrideTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
}
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTrialOverrideTest, Test) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://field.trial.com/")));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://bar.com/")));
}
// Ensure that --disable-site-isolation-trials and/or
// --disable-site-isolation-for-policy do not override the flag.
class IsolatedOriginPolicyOverrideTest : public IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest {
public:
IsolatedOriginPolicyOverrideTest() = default;
~IsolatedOriginPolicyOverrideTest() override = default;
IsolatedOriginPolicyOverrideTest(const IsolatedOriginPolicyOverrideTest&) =
delete;
IsolatedOriginPolicyOverrideTest& operator=(
const IsolatedOriginPolicyOverrideTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginFieldTrialTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteIsolationForPolicy);
#endif
}
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginPolicyOverrideTest, Test) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://field.trial.com/")));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(GURL("https://bar.com/")));
}
// Ensure that --disable-site-isolation-trials and/or
// --disable-site-isolation-for-policy do not override the flag.
class IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest : public IsolatedOriginTest {
public:
IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest() = default;
~IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest() override = default;
IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest(const IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest&) =
delete;
IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest& operator=(
const IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteIsolationForPolicy);
#endif
}
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest, Test) {
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/title2.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(isolated_url));
}
// Verify that main frame's origin isolation still keeps all same-origin frames
// in the same process. When allocating processes for a(b(c),d(c)), we should
// ensure that "c" frames are in the same process.
//
// This is a regression test for https://crbug.com/787576.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginNoFlagOverrideTest,
SameOriginSubframesProcessSharing) {
GURL main_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"isolated.foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?isolated.foo.com(b(c),d(c))"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), main_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
RenderFrameHost* a = root->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* b = root->child_at(0)->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* c1 = root->child_at(0)->child_at(0)->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* d = root->child_at(1)->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHost* c2 = root->child_at(1)->child_at(0)->current_frame_host();
// Sanity check that the test works with the right frame tree.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(a->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(b->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(d->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(c1->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(c2->GetLastCommittedOrigin()));
EXPECT_EQ("b.com", b->GetLastCommittedURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("d.com", d->GetLastCommittedURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("c.com", c1->GetLastCommittedURL().host());
EXPECT_EQ("c.com", c2->GetLastCommittedURL().host());
// Verify that the isolated site is indeed isolated.
EXPECT_NE(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), c1->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), c2->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), b->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(a->GetProcess()->GetID(), d->GetProcess()->GetID());
// Verify that same-origin c1 and c2 frames share a process. This is
// necessary for correctness - otherwise c1 and c2 wouldn't be able to
// synchronously script each other.
EXPECT_EQ(c1->GetProcess()->GetID(), c2->GetProcess()->GetID());
// Verify that same-origin c1 and c2 frames can script each other.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(c1, "window.name = 'c1';"));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(c2, R"(
c1 = window.open('', 'c1');
c1.cross_frame_property_test = 'hello from c2'; )"));
EXPECT_EQ("hello from c2", EvalJs(c1, "window.cross_frame_property_test;"));
// The test assertions below are not strictly necessary - they just document
// the current behavior and might be tweaked if needed. In particular,
// consolidating b,c,d sites into the same process is not necessary for
// correctness. Consolidation might be desirable if we want to limit the
// number of renderer processes. OTOH, consolidation might be undesirable
// if we desire smaller renderer processes (even if it means more processes).
if (!AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
EXPECT_EQ(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), c1->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), c2->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), d->GetProcess()->GetID());
} else {
EXPECT_NE(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), c1->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), c2->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_NE(b->GetProcess()->GetID(), d->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(c1->GetProcess()->GetID(), c2->GetProcess()->GetID());
}
}
// Helper class for testing dynamically-added isolated origins. Tests that use
// this run without full --site-per-process, but with two isolated origins that
// are configured at startup (isolated.foo.com and isolated.bar.com).
class DynamicIsolatedOriginTest : public IsolatedOriginTest {
public:
DynamicIsolatedOriginTest()
: https_server_(net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS) {}
~DynamicIsolatedOriginTest() override = default;
DynamicIsolatedOriginTest(const DynamicIsolatedOriginTest&) = delete;
DynamicIsolatedOriginTest& operator=(const DynamicIsolatedOriginTest&) =
delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "This test should be run without strict site isolation. "
<< "It does nothing when --site-per-process is specified.";
}
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
https_server()->AddDefaultHandlers(GetTestDataFilePath());
ASSERT_TRUE(https_server()->Start());
IsolatedOriginTest::SetUpOnMainThread();
}
// Need an https server because third-party cookies are used, and
// SameSite=None cookies must be Secure.
net::EmbeddedTestServer* https_server() { return &https_server_; }
private:
net::EmbeddedTestServer https_server_;
};
// Check that dynamically added isolated origins take effect for future
// BrowsingInstances only.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest,
IsolationAppliesToFutureBrowsingInstances) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Start on a non-isolated origin with same-site iframe.
GURL foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
// Navigate iframe cross-site.
GURL bar_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title1.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", bar_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), bar_url);
// The two frames should be in the same process, since neither site is
// isolated so far.
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Start isolating foo.com.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// The isolation shouldn't take effect in the current frame tree, so that it
// doesn't break same-site scripting. Navigate iframe to a foo.com URL and
// ensure it stays in the same process.
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", foo_url);
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Also try a foo(bar(foo)) hierarchy and check that all frames are still in
// the same SiteInstance/process.
GURL bar_with_foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"bar.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?bar.com(foo.com)"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", bar_with_foo_url);
FrameTreeNode* grandchild = child->child_at(0);
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Create an unrelated window, which will be in a new BrowsingInstance.
// Ensure that foo.com becomes an isolated origin in that window. A
// cross-site bar.com subframe on foo.com should now become an OOPIF.
Shell* second_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(second_shell, foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* second_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(second_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
FrameTreeNode* second_child = second_root->child_at(0);
NavigateIframeToURL(second_shell->web_contents(), "test_iframe", bar_url);
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> foo_instance =
second_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(foo_instance,
second_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(second_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
second_child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Now try the reverse: ensure that when bar.com embeds foo.com, foo.com
// becomes an OOPIF.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(second_shell, bar_with_foo_url));
// We should've swapped processes in the main frame, since we navigated from
// (isolated) foo.com to (non-isolated) bar.com.
EXPECT_NE(foo_instance, second_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Ensure the new foo.com subframe is cross-process.
second_child = second_root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_NE(second_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
second_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(second_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
second_child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
}
// Check that dynamically added isolated origins take effect for future
// BrowsingInstances only, focusing on various main frame navigations.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest, MainFrameNavigations) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Create three windows on a non-isolated origin.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
Shell* shell2 = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell2, foo_url));
Shell* shell3 = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell3, foo_url));
// Create window.open popups in all three windows, which would prevent a
// BrowsingInstance swap on renderer-initiated navigations to newly isolated
// origins in these windows.
OpenPopup(shell(), foo_url, "");
OpenPopup(shell2, GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL), "");
OpenPopup(shell3, embedded_test_server()->GetURL("baz.com", "/title1.html"),
"");
// Start isolating bar.com.
GURL bar_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title2.html"));
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(bar_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// Do a renderer-initiated navigation in each of the existing three windows.
// None of them should swap to a new process, since bar.com shouldn't be
// isolated in those older BrowsingInstances.
int old_process_id =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(shell(), bar_url));
EXPECT_EQ(old_process_id,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID());
old_process_id =
shell2->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(shell2, bar_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
old_process_id,
shell2->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID());
old_process_id =
shell3->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(shell3, bar_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
old_process_id,
shell3->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID());
// Now try the same in a new window and BrowsingInstance, and ensure that the
// navigation to bar.com swaps processes in that case.
Shell* shell4 = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell4, foo_url));
old_process_id =
shell4->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(shell4, bar_url));
EXPECT_NE(
old_process_id,
shell4->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID());
// Go back to foo.com in window 1, ensuring this stays in the same process.
{
old_process_id =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
TestNavigationObserver back_observer(web_contents());
web_contents()->GetController().GoBack();
back_observer.Wait();
EXPECT_EQ(old_process_id,
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID());
}
// Go back to foo.com in window 4, ensuring this swaps processes.
{
old_process_id =
shell4->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
TestNavigationObserver back_observer(shell4->web_contents());
shell4->web_contents()->GetController().GoBack();
back_observer.Wait();
EXPECT_NE(
old_process_id,
shell4->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID());
}
}
// Check that dynamically added isolated origins do not prevent older processes
// for the same origin from accessing cookies.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest, OldProcessCanAccessCookies) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
// Since foo.com isn't isolated yet, its process lock should allow any site.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(root->current_frame_host()
->GetProcess()
->GetProcessLock()
.allows_any_site());
// Start isolating foo.com.
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// Create an unrelated window, which will be in a new BrowsingInstance.
// foo.com will become an isolated origin in that window.
Shell* second_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(second_shell, foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* second_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(second_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
// The new window's process should be locked to "foo.com".
int isolated_foo_com_process_id =
second_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->GetID();
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLockFromUrl("http://foo.com"),
policy->GetProcessLock(isolated_foo_com_process_id));
// Make sure both old and new foo.com processes can access cookies without
// renderer kills.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(root, "document.cookie = 'foo=bar';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=bar", EvalJs(root, "document.cookie"));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(second_root, "document.cookie = 'foo=bar';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=bar", EvalJs(second_root, "document.cookie"));
// Navigate to sub.foo.com in `second_shell`, staying in same
// BrowsingInstance. This should stay in the same process.
GURL sub_foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("sub.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLInSameBrowsingInstance(second_shell, sub_foo_url));
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_foo_com_process_id,
second_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->GetID());
// Now, start isolating sub.foo.com.
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(sub_foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// Make sure the process locked to foo.com, which currently has sub.foo.com
// committed in it, can still access sub.foo.com cookies.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(second_root, "document.cookie = 'foo=baz';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=baz", EvalJs(second_root, "document.cookie"));
// Now, navigate to sub.foo.com in a new BrowsingInstance. This should go
// into a new process, locked to sub.foo.com.
// TODO(alexmos): navigating to bar.com prior to navigating to sub.foo.com is
// currently needed since we only swap BrowsingInstances on cross-site
// address bar navigations. We should look into swapping BrowsingInstances
// even on same-site browser-initiated navigations, in cases where the sites
// change due to a dynamically isolated origin.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(
second_shell, embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title2.html")));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(second_shell, sub_foo_url));
EXPECT_NE(isolated_foo_com_process_id,
second_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->GetID());
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLockFromUrl("http://sub.foo.com"),
second_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
// Make sure that process can also access sub.foo.com cookies.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(second_root, "document.cookie = 'foo=qux';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=qux", EvalJs(second_root, "document.cookie"));
}
// Verify that when isolating sub.foo.com dynamically, foo.com and sub.foo.com
// start to be treated as cross-site for process model decisions.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest, IsolatedSubdomain) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
// Start isolating sub.foo.com.
GURL sub_foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("sub.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(sub_foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// Navigate to foo.com and then to sub.foo.com in a new BrowsingInstance.
// foo.com and sub.foo.com should now be considered cross-site for the
// purposes of process assignment, and we should swap processes.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, foo_url));
int initial_process_id =
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(new_shell, sub_foo_url));
EXPECT_NE(
initial_process_id,
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID());
// Repeat this, but now navigate a subframe on foo.com to sub.foo.com and
// ensure that it is rendered in an OOPIF.
new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, foo_url));
NavigateIframeToURL(new_shell->web_contents(), "test_iframe", sub_foo_url);
FrameTreeNode* root = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(new_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
}
// Check that when an isolated origin takes effect in BrowsingInstance 1, a new
// BrowsingInstance 2, which reuses an old process from BrowsingInstance 1 for
// its main frame, still applies the isolated origin to its subframe. This
// demonstrates that isolated origins can't be scoped purely based on process
// IDs.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest,
NewBrowsingInstanceInOldProcess) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Force process reuse for main frames in new BrowsingInstances.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Start on a non-isolated origin with same-site iframe.
GURL foo_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
// Navigate iframe cross-site.
GURL bar_url(https_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title1.html"));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", bar_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), bar_url);
// The iframe should not be in an OOPIF yet.
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Start isolating bar.com.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(bar_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// Open a new window in a new BrowsingInstance. Navigate to foo.com and
// check that the old foo.com process is reused.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* new_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(new_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
FrameTreeNode* new_child = new_root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_EQ(new_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(new_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(
new_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->IsRelatedSiteInstance(
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()));
// Navigate iframe in the second window to bar.com, and check that it becomes
// an OOPIF in its own process.
NavigateIframeToURL(new_shell->web_contents(), "test_iframe", bar_url);
EXPECT_EQ(new_child->current_url(), bar_url);
EXPECT_NE(new_child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
new_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(new_child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(new_child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_NE(new_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
new_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(new_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// The old foo.com process should still be able to access bar.com data,
// since it isn't locked to a specific site.
int old_process_id = root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->GetID();
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->CanAccessDataForOrigin(old_process_id,
url::Origin::Create(bar_url)));
// In particular, make sure the bar.com iframe in the old foo.com process can
// still access bar.com cookies.
EXPECT_TRUE(
ExecJs(child, "document.cookie = 'foo=bar;SameSite=None;Secure';"));
EXPECT_EQ("foo=bar", EvalJs(child, "document.cookie"));
// Make sure the BrowsingInstanceId is cleaned up immediately.
policy->SetBrowsingInstanceCleanupDelayForTesting(0);
// Now close the first window. This destroys the first BrowsingInstance and
// leaves only the newer BrowsingInstance (with a foo.com main frame) in the
// old process.
shell()->Close();
// Now that the process only contains a BrowsingInstance where bar.com is
// considered isolated and cannot reuse the old process, it should lose access
// to bar.com's data due to citadel enforcement in CanAccessDataForOrigin.
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kSiteIsolationCitadelEnforcement)) {
EXPECT_FALSE(policy->CanAccessDataForOrigin(old_process_id,
url::Origin::Create(bar_url)));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(policy->CanAccessDataForOrigin(old_process_id,
url::Origin::Create(bar_url)));
}
}
// Verify that a process locked to foo.com is not reused for a navigation to
// foo.com that does not require a dedicated process. See
// https://crbug.com/950453.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest,
LockedProcessNotReusedForNonisolatedSameSiteNavigation) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Set the process limit to 1.
RenderProcessHost::SetMaxRendererProcessCount(1);
// Start on a non-isolated foo.com URL.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
// Navigate to a different isolated origin and wait for the original foo.com
// process to shut down. Note that the foo.com SiteInstance will stick
// around in session history.
RenderProcessHostWatcher foo_process_observer(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(),
RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_HOST_DESTRUCTION);
// Disable the BackForwardCache to ensure the old process is going to be
// released.
DisableBackForwardCacheForTesting(web_contents(),
BackForwardCache::TEST_REQUIRES_NO_CACHING);
GURL isolated_bar_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.bar.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_bar_url));
foo_process_observer.Wait();
EXPECT_TRUE(foo_process_observer.did_exit_normally());
// Start isolating foo.com.
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// Create a new window, forcing a new BrowsingInstance, and navigate it to
// foo.com, which will spin up a process locked to foo.com.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, foo_url));
RenderProcessHost* new_process =
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLockFromUrl("http://foo.com"),
new_process->GetProcessLock());
// Go to foo.com in the older first tab, where foo.com does not require a
// dedicated process. Ensure that the existing locked foo.com process is
// *not* reused in that case (if that were the case, LockProcessIfNeeded
// would trigger a CHECK here). Using a history navigation here ensures that
// the SiteInstance (from session history) will have a foo.com site URL,
// rather than a default site URL, since this case isn't yet handled by the
// default SiteInstance (see crbug.com/787576).
TestNavigationObserver observer(web_contents());
web_contents()->GetController().GoBack();
observer.Wait();
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess(), new_process);
}
// Checks that isolated origins can be added only for a specific profile,
// and that they don't apply to other profiles.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest, PerProfileIsolation) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Create a browser in a different profile.
BrowserContext* main_context = shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
Shell* other_shell = CreateOffTheRecordBrowser();
BrowserContext* other_context =
other_shell->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
ASSERT_NE(main_context, other_context);
// Start on bar.com in both browsers.
GURL bar_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("bar.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), bar_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(other_shell, bar_url));
// Start isolating foo.com in `other_context` only.
GURL foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, other_context);
// Verify that foo.com is indeed isolated in `other_shell`, by navigating to
// it in a new BrowsingInstance and checking that a bar.com subframe becomes
// an OOPIF.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(other_shell, foo_url));
WebContentsImpl* other_contents =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(other_shell->web_contents());
NavigateIframeToURL(other_contents, "test_iframe", bar_url);
FrameTreeNode* root = other_contents->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), bar_url);
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Verify that foo.com is *not* isolated in the regular shell, due to a
// different profile.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", bar_url);
root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), bar_url);
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
}
// Check that a dynamically added isolated origin can take effect on the next
// main frame navigation by forcing a BrowsingInstance swap, in the case that
// there are no script references to the frame being navigated.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest, ForceBrowsingInstanceSwap) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Navigate to a non-isolated page with a cross-site iframe. The frame
// shouldn't be in an OOPIF.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(bar.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> first_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
if (AreStrictSiteInstancesEnabled()) {
EXPECT_NE(first_instance, child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(first_instance, child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
}
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(first_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock().allows_any_site());
// Start isolating foo.com.
BrowserContext* context = shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, context);
// Try navigating to another foo URL.
GURL foo2_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(baz.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo2_url));
// Verify that this navigation ended up in a dedicated process, and that we
// swapped BrowsingInstances in the process.
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> second_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(first_instance, second_instance);
EXPECT_FALSE(first_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(second_instance.get()));
EXPECT_NE(first_instance->GetProcess(), second_instance->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLockFromUrl("http://foo.com"),
second_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
// The frame on that page should now be an OOPIF.
child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_NE(second_instance, child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
}
// Same as the test above, but using a renderer-initiated navigation. Check
// that a dynamically added isolated origin can take effect on the next main
// frame navigation by forcing a BrowsingInstance swap, in the case that there
// are no script references to the frame being navigated.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest,
ForceBrowsingInstanceSwap_RendererInitiated) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Navigate to a foo.com page.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> first_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(first_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(first_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock().allows_any_site());
// Set a sessionStorage value, to sanity check that foo.com's session storage
// will still be accessible after the BrowsingInstance swap.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(root, "window.sessionStorage['foo'] = 'bar';"));
// Start isolating foo.com.
BrowserContext* context = shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, context);
// Do a renderer-initiated navigation to another foo URL.
GURL foo2_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(baz.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(shell(), foo2_url));
// Verify that this navigation ended up in a dedicated process, and that we
// swapped BrowsingInstances in the process.
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> second_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(first_instance, second_instance);
EXPECT_FALSE(first_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(second_instance.get()));
EXPECT_NE(first_instance->GetProcess(), second_instance->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLockFromUrl("http://foo.com"),
second_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock());
// The frame on that page should be an OOPIF.
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_NE(second_instance, child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Verify that the isolated foo.com page can still access session storage set
// by the previous foo.com page.
EXPECT_EQ("bar", EvalJs(root, "window.sessionStorage['foo']"));
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(DynamicIsolatedOriginTest,
DontForceBrowsingInstanceSwapWhenScriptReferencesExist) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Navigate to a page that won't be in a dedicated process.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> first_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(first_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// Start isolating foo.com.
BrowserContext* context = shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, context);
// Open a popup.
GURL popup_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/title1.html"));
OpenPopup(shell(), popup_url, "");
// Try navigating the main frame to another foo URL.
GURL foo2_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title2.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(shell(), foo2_url));
// This navigation should not end up in a dedicated process. The popup
// should prevent the BrowsingInstance swap heuristic from applying, since it
// should still be able to communicate with the opener after the navigation.
EXPECT_EQ(first_instance, root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(first_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(first_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock().allows_any_site());
}
// This test ensures that when a page becomes isolated in the middle of
// creating and navigating a new window, the new window prevents a
// BrowsingInstance swap.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(
DynamicIsolatedOriginTest,
DontForceBrowsingInstanceSwapWithPendingNavigationInNewWindow) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Navigate to a page that won't be in a dedicated process.
GURL foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> first_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(first_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// Open and start navigating a popup to a URL that never finishes loading.
GURL popup_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/hung"));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(root, JsReplace("window.open($1);", popup_url)));
// Start isolating foo.com.
BrowserContext* context = shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
policy->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, context);
// Navigate the main frame to another foo URL.
GURL foo2_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/title2.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(shell(), foo2_url));
// This navigation should not end up in a dedicated process. The pending
// navigation in the popup should prevent the BrowsingInstance swap heuristic
// from applying, since it should still be able to communicate with the
// opener after the navigation.
EXPECT_EQ(first_instance, root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(first_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(first_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock().allows_any_site());
}
class IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances : public IsolatedOriginTest {
public:
IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
features::kProcessSharingWithStrictSiteInstances);
}
~IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances() override = default;
IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances(
const IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances&) = delete;
IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances& operator=(
const IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances&) = delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "This test should be run without strict site isolation. "
<< "It does nothing when --site-per-process is specified.";
}
}
private:
base::test::ScopedFeatureList scoped_feature_list_;
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances,
NonIsolatedFramesCanShareDefaultProcess) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL top_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("/frame_tree/page_with_two_frames.html"));
ASSERT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(top_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), top_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child1 = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child2 = root->child_at(1);
GURL bar_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.bar.com", "/title3.html"));
ASSERT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(bar_url)));
{
TestFrameNavigationObserver observer(child1);
NavigationHandleObserver handle_observer(web_contents(), bar_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(child1, "location.href = '" + bar_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
}
GURL baz_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.baz.com", "/title3.html"));
ASSERT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(baz_url)));
{
TestFrameNavigationObserver observer(child2);
NavigationHandleObserver handle_observer(web_contents(), baz_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(child2, "location.href = '" + baz_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
}
// All 3 frames are from different sites, so each should have its own
// SiteInstance.
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(child1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(
" Site A ------------ proxies for B C\n"
" |--Site B ------- proxies for A C\n"
" +--Site C ------- proxies for A B\n"
"Where A = http://127.0.0.1/\n"
" B = http://bar.com/\n"
" C = http://baz.com/",
DepictFrameTree(*root));
// But none are isolated, so all should share the default process for their
// BrowsingInstance.
RenderProcessHost* host = root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(host, child1->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(host, child2->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(host->GetProcessLock().allows_any_site());
}
// Creates a non-isolated main frame with an isolated child and non-isolated
// grandchild. With strict site isolation disabled and
// kProcessSharingWithStrictSiteInstances enabled, the main frame and the
// grandchild should be in the same process even though they have different
// SiteInstances.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances,
IsolatedChildWithNonIsolatedGrandchild) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL top_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
ASSERT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(top_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), top_url));
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com",
"/page_with_iframe.html"));
ASSERT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(isolated_url)));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), isolated_url);
// Verify that the child frame is an OOPIF with a different SiteInstance.
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(child->current_frame_host()->IsCrossProcessSubframe());
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://isolated.foo.com/"),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
// Verify that the isolated frame's subframe (which starts out at a relative
// path) is kept in the isolated parent's SiteInstance.
FrameTreeNode* grandchild = child->child_at(0);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// Navigating the grandchild to www.bar.com should put it into the top
// frame's process, but not its SiteInstance.
GURL non_isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.bar.com", "/title3.html"));
ASSERT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_url)));
TestFrameNavigationObserver observer(grandchild);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ExecJs(grandchild, "location.href = '" + non_isolated_url.spec() + "';"));
observer.Wait();
EXPECT_EQ(non_isolated_url, grandchild->current_url());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
grandchild->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(
" Site A ------------ proxies for B C\n"
" +--Site B ------- proxies for A C\n"
" +--Site C -- proxies for A B\n"
"Where A = http://foo.com/\n"
" B = http://isolated.foo.com/\n"
" C = http://bar.com/",
DepictFrameTree(*root));
}
// Navigate a frame into and out of an isolated origin. This should not
// confuse BrowsingInstance into holding onto a stale default_process_.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances,
SubframeNavigatesOutofIsolationThenToIsolation) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL isolated_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com",
"/page_with_iframe.html"));
ASSERT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(isolated_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), isolated_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_EQ(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(child->current_frame_host()->IsCrossProcessSubframe());
GURL non_isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title3.html"));
ASSERT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(non_isolated_url)));
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", non_isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), non_isolated_url);
// Verify that the child frame is an OOPIF with a different SiteInstance.
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
// Navigating the child to the isolated origin again.
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
// And navigate out of the isolated origin one last time.
NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "test_iframe", non_isolated_url);
EXPECT_EQ(child->current_url(), non_isolated_url);
EXPECT_NE(web_contents()->GetSiteInstance(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(
" Site A ------------ proxies for B\n"
" +--Site B ------- proxies for A\n"
"Where A = http://isolated.foo.com/\n"
" B = http://foo.com/",
DepictFrameTree(*root));
}
// Ensure a popup and its opener can go in the same process, even though
// they have different SiteInstances with kProcessSharingWithStrictSiteInstances
// enabled.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(IsolatedOriginTestWithStrictSiteInstances,
NonIsolatedPopup) {
// This test is designed to run without strict site isolation.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL foo_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/page_with_iframe.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), foo_url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
// Open a blank popup.
ShellAddedObserver new_shell_observer;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(root, "window.w = window.open();"));
Shell* new_shell = new_shell_observer.GetShell();
// Have the opener navigate the popup to a non-isolated origin.
GURL isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.bar.com", "/title1.html"));
{
TestNavigationManager manager(new_shell->web_contents(), isolated_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(
root, "window.w.location.href = '" + isolated_url.spec() + "';"));
ASSERT_TRUE(manager.WaitForNavigationFinished());
}
// The popup and the opener should not share a SiteInstance, but should
// end up in the same process.
EXPECT_NE(new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance(),
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_EQ(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess());
EXPECT_EQ(
" Site A ------------ proxies for B\n"
" +--Site A ------- proxies for B\n"
"Where A = http://foo.com/\n"
" B = http://bar.com/",
DepictFrameTree(*root));
EXPECT_EQ(
" Site A ------------ proxies for B\n"
"Where A = http://bar.com/\n"
" B = http://foo.com/",
DepictFrameTree(*static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(new_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root()));
}
class WildcardOriginIsolationTest : public IsolatedOriginTestBase {
public:
WildcardOriginIsolationTest() = default;
~WildcardOriginIsolationTest() override = default;
WildcardOriginIsolationTest(const WildcardOriginIsolationTest&) = delete;
WildcardOriginIsolationTest& operator=(const WildcardOriginIsolationTest&) =
delete;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen());
std::string origin_list =
MakeWildcard(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("isolated.foo.com", "/")) +
"," + embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com", "/").spec();
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kIsolateOrigins, origin_list);
// This is needed for this test to run properly on platforms where
// --site-per-process isn't the default, such as Android.
IsolateAllSitesForTesting(command_line);
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
embedded_test_server()->StartAcceptingConnections();
}
private:
const char* kAllSubdomainWildcard = "[*.]";
// Calling GetURL() on the embedded test server will escape any '*' characters
// into '%2A', so to create a wildcard origin they must be post-processed to
// have the string '[*.]' inserted at the correct point.
std::string MakeWildcard(GURL url) {
DCHECK(url.is_valid());
return url.scheme() + url::kStandardSchemeSeparator +
kAllSubdomainWildcard + url.GetContent();
}
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(WildcardOriginIsolationTest, MainFrameNavigation) {
GURL a_foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL b_foo_url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("b.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL a_isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
GURL b_isolated_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("b.isolated.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(a_foo_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(b_foo_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(a_isolated_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(b_isolated_url));
// Navigate in the following order, all within the same shell:
// 1. a_foo_url
// 2. b_foo_url -- check (1) and (2) have the same pids / instances (*)
// 3. a_isolated_url
// 4. b_isolated_url -- check (2), (3) and (4) have distinct pids / instances
// 5. a_foo_url -- check (4) and (5) have distinct pids / instances
// 6. b_foo_url -- check (5) and (6) have the same pids / instances (*)
// (*) SiteInstances will be the same unless ProactivelySwapBrowsingInstances
// is enabled for same-site navigations.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), a_foo_url));
int a_foo_pid =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> a_foo_instance =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), b_foo_url));
int b_foo_pid =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> b_foo_instance =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
// Check that hosts in the wildcard subdomain (but not the wildcard subdomain
// itself) have their processes reused between navigation events.
EXPECT_EQ(a_foo_pid, b_foo_pid);
if (CanSameSiteMainFrameNavigationsChangeSiteInstances()) {
EXPECT_NE(a_foo_instance, b_foo_instance);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(a_foo_instance, b_foo_instance);
}
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), a_isolated_url));
int a_isolated_pid =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> a_isolated_instance =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), b_isolated_url));
int b_isolated_pid =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> b_isolated_instance =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
// Navigating from a non-wildcard domain to a wildcard domain should result in
// a new process.
EXPECT_NE(b_foo_pid, b_isolated_pid);
EXPECT_NE(b_foo_instance, b_isolated_instance);
// Navigating to another URL within the wildcard domain should always result
// in a new process.
EXPECT_NE(a_isolated_pid, b_isolated_pid);
EXPECT_NE(a_isolated_instance, b_isolated_instance);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), a_foo_url));
a_foo_pid =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
a_foo_instance =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), b_foo_url));
b_foo_pid =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
b_foo_instance =
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
// Navigating from the wildcard subdomain to the isolated subdomain should
// produce a new pid.
EXPECT_NE(a_foo_pid, b_isolated_pid);
EXPECT_NE(a_foo_instance, b_isolated_instance);
// Confirm that navigation events in the isolated domain behave the same as
// before visiting the wildcard subdomain.
EXPECT_EQ(a_foo_pid, b_foo_pid);
if (CanSameSiteMainFrameNavigationsChangeSiteInstances()) {
EXPECT_NE(a_foo_instance, b_foo_instance);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(a_foo_instance, b_foo_instance);
}
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(WildcardOriginIsolationTest, SubFrameNavigation) {
GURL url = embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"a.foo.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?a.foo.com("
"isolated.foo.com,b.foo.com("
"b.isolated.foo.com,a.foo.com,a.isolated.com))");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
EXPECT_EQ(
" Site A ------------ proxies for B C D\n"
" |--Site B ------- proxies for A C D\n"
" +--Site A ------- proxies for B C D\n"
" |--Site C -- proxies for A B D\n"
" |--Site A -- proxies for B C D\n"
" +--Site D -- proxies for A B C\n"
"Where A = http://foo.com/\n"
" B = http://isolated.foo.com/\n"
" C = http://b.isolated.foo.com/\n"
" D = http://isolated.com/",
DepictFrameTree(*root));
}
// Helper class for testing site isolation triggered by
// Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy headers. These tests disable strict site
// isolation by default, so that we can check whether a site becomes isolated
// due to COOP on both desktop and Android.
class COOPIsolationTest : public IsolatedOriginTestBase {
public:
// Note: the COOP header is only populated for HTTPS.
COOPIsolationTest() : https_server_(net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
features::kSiteIsolationForCrossOriginOpenerPolicy);
}
~COOPIsolationTest() override = default;
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen());
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::SetUpOnMainThread();
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
embedded_test_server()->StartAcceptingConnections();
https_server()->AddDefaultHandlers(GetTestDataFilePath());
ASSERT_TRUE(https_server()->Start());
browser_client_ = std::make_unique<NoSiteIsolationContentBrowserClient>();
// The custom ContentBrowserClient above typically ensures that this test
// runs without strict site isolation, but it's still possible to
// inadvertently override this when running with --site-per-process on the
// command line. This might happen on try bots, so these tests take this
// into account to prevent failures, but this is not an intended
// configuration for these tests, since with strict site isolation COOP
// doesn't need to dynamically isolate any sites.
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "This test should be run without --site-per-process, "
<< "as it's designed to exercise code paths when strict "
<< "site isolation is turned off.";
}
}
void TearDownOnMainThread() override {
IsolatedOriginTestBase::TearDownOnMainThread();
browser_client_.reset();
}
net::EmbeddedTestServer* https_server() { return &https_server_; }
// A custom ContentBrowserClient to turn off strict site isolation, since
// COOP isolation only matters in environments like Android where it
// is not used. Note that kSitePerProcess is a higher-layer feature, so we
// can't just disable it here.
class NoSiteIsolationContentBrowserClient
: public ContentBrowserTestContentBrowserClient {
public:
bool ShouldEnableStrictSiteIsolation() override { return false; }
};
private:
base::test::ScopedFeatureList scoped_feature_list_;
net::EmbeddedTestServer https_server_;
std::unique_ptr<NoSiteIsolationContentBrowserClient> browser_client_;
};
// Check that a main frame navigation to a COOP site (with no subsequent user
// gesture) triggers isolation for that site within the current
// BrowsingInstance.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, SameOrigin) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL no_coop_url = https_server()->GetURL("a.com", "/title1.html");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), no_coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kUnsafeNone);
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> first_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(first_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// Navigate to a b.com URL with COOP, swapping BrowsingInstances.
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"b.com", "/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOrigin);
SiteInstanceImpl* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
// The b.com COOP page should trigger the isolation heuristic and require a
// dedicated process locked to b.com.
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
auto lock = coop_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
EXPECT_TRUE(lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLockFromUrl("https://b.com"), lock);
// Check that a cross-site subframe in a non-isolated site becomes an OOPIF
// in a new, non-isolated SiteInstance.
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell(),
"var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');"
"iframe.id = 'child';"
"document.body.appendChild(iframe);",
EXECUTE_SCRIPT_NO_USER_GESTURE));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
GURL c_url(https_server()->GetURL("c.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "child", c_url));
SiteInstanceImpl* child_instance =
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(coop_instance, child_instance);
EXPECT_NE(coop_instance->GetProcess(), child_instance->GetProcess());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// Navigating the subframe back to b.com should bring it back to the parent
// SiteInstance.
GURL b_url(https_server()->GetURL("b.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "child", b_url));
child_instance = child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(coop_instance, child_instance);
// Create a new window, forcing a new BrowsingInstance, and check that b.com
// is *not* isolated in it. Since b.com in `coop_instance`'s
// BrowsingInstance hasn't received a user gesture, the COOP isolation does
// not apply to other BrowsingInstances.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
GURL no_coop_b_url = https_server()->GetURL("b.com", "/title2.html");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, no_coop_b_url));
SiteInstanceImpl* new_instance = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(new_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
}
// Verify that the same-origin-allow-popups COOP header value triggers
// isolation, and that this behaves sanely with window.open().
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, SameOriginAllowPopups) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Navigate to a coop.com URL with COOP.
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"coop.com",
"/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin-allow-popups");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOriginAllowPopups);
SiteInstanceImpl* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
// The coop.com COOP page should trigger the isolation heuristic and require
// a dedicated process locked to coop.com.
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
auto lock = coop_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
EXPECT_TRUE(lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLockFromUrl("https://coop.com"), lock);
// Open a non-COOP same-site URL in a popup, which should stay in the same
// BrowsingInstance because of same-origin-allow-popups. Verify that the
// popup ends up in the same SiteInstance as the opener (which requires a
// dedicated process).
GURL popup_url(https_server()->GetURL("coop.com", "/title1.html"));
Shell* popup = OpenPopup(shell(), popup_url, "");
RenderFrameHostImpl* popup_rfh = static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
popup->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame());
EXPECT_EQ(popup_rfh->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kUnsafeNone);
EXPECT_EQ(popup_rfh->GetSiteInstance(), coop_instance);
// Navigate the popup to another non-isolated site, staying in the same
// BrowsingInstance, and verify that it swaps to a new non-isolated
// SiteInstance. The non-isolated site has a child which is same-origin with
// the COOP page; verify that it's placed in the same SiteInstance as the
// COOP page, as they are allowed to synchronously script each other.
GURL a_url(https_server()->GetURL(
"a.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?a.com(coop.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(popup, a_url));
SiteInstanceImpl* new_instance = static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(
popup->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_FALSE(new_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_NE(new_instance, coop_instance);
FrameTreeNode* popup_child =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(popup->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root()
->child_at(0);
EXPECT_EQ(popup_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(),
coop_instance);
// Navigate the popup to coop.com again, staying in the same
// BrowsingInstance, and verify that it goes back to the opener's
// SiteInstance.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(popup, popup_url));
EXPECT_EQ(popup->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance(),
coop_instance);
}
// Verify that COOP isolation applies at a site (and not origin) granularity.
//
// Isolating sites rather than origins may seem counterintuitive, considering
// the COOP header value that triggers isolation is "same-origin". However,
// process isolation granularity that we can infer from COOP is quite different
// from what that actual COOP value controls. The COOP "same-origin" value
// specifies when to sever opener relationships and create a new
// BrowsingInstance; a COOP "same-origin" main frame document may only stay in
// the same BrowsingInstance as other same-origin COOP documents. However,
// this does not apply to iframes, and it's possible to have a
// foo.bar.coop.com(baz.coop.com) hierarchy where the main frame has COOP
// "same-origin" but both frames set document.domain to coop.com and
// synchronously script each other (*). Hence, in this case, we must isolate
// the coop.com site and place the two frames in the same process. This test
// covers that precise scenario.
//
// (*) In the future, COOP may disallow document.domain, in which case we may
// need to revisit this. See https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/6177.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, SiteGranularity) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
// Navigate to a URL with COOP, where the origin doesn't match the site.
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"foo.bar.coop.com",
"/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOrigin);
SiteInstanceImpl* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// Ensure that the process lock is for the site, not origin.
auto lock = coop_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
EXPECT_TRUE(lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_EQ(ProcessLockFromUrl("https://coop.com"), lock);
// Check that a same-site cross-origin subframe stays in the same
// SiteInstance and process.
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell(),
"var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');"
"iframe.id = 'child';"
"document.body.appendChild(iframe);"));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
GURL c_url(https_server()->GetURL("baz.coop.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "child", c_url));
SiteInstanceImpl* child_instance =
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(coop_instance, child_instance);
// Check that ChildProcessSecurityPolicy considers coop.com (and not its
// subdomain) to be the matching isolated origin for `coop_url`.
url::Origin matching_isolated_origin;
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()
->GetMatchingProcessIsolatedOrigin(coop_instance->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(GURL(coop_url)),
false /* origin_requests_isolation */,
&matching_isolated_origin);
EXPECT_EQ(matching_isolated_origin,
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://coop.com")));
}
// Verify that COOP isolation applies when both COOP and COEP headers are set
// (i.e., for a cross-origin-isolated page). This results in a different COOP
// header value (kSameOriginPlusCoep) which should still trigger isolation.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, COOPAndCOEP) {
// Navigate to a URL with COOP + COEP.
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"coop.com",
"/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin&"
"Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOriginPlusCoep);
// Make sure that site isolation for coop.com was triggered and that the
// navigation ended up in a site-locked process.
SiteInstanceImpl* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
auto lock = coop_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
EXPECT_TRUE(lock.GetWebExposedIsolationInfo().is_isolated());
EXPECT_TRUE(lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_TRUE(
lock.MatchesOrigin(url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://coop.com"))));
}
// Check that when a site triggers both COOP isolation and OriginAgentCluster,
// both mechanisms take effect. This test uses a URL with default ports so
// that we can exercise the site URL being the same with both COOP and OAC.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, COOPAndOriginAgentClusterNoPorts) {
// Since the embedded test server only works for URLs with non-default ports,
// use a URLLoaderInterceptor to mimic port-free operation. This allows
// checking the site URL being identical for both COOP and OAC isolation,
// since otherwise OAC would include ports in the site URL. The interceptor
// below returns COOP and OAC headers for any page on foo.com, and returns a
// simple test page without any headers for a.foo.com and b.foo.com.
URLLoaderInterceptor interceptor(base::BindLambdaForTesting(
[&](URLLoaderInterceptor::RequestParams* params) {
if (params->url_request.url.host() == "foo.com") {
const std::string headers =
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n"
"Content-Type: text/html\n"
"Origin-Agent-Cluster: ?1\n"
"Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin\n";
URLLoaderInterceptor::WriteResponse(
"content/test/data" + params->url_request.url.path(),
params->client.get(), &headers, absl::optional<net::SSLInfo>());
return true;
} else if (params->url_request.url.host() == "a.foo.com" ||
params->url_request.url.host() == "b.foo.com") {
URLLoaderInterceptor::WriteResponse("content/test/data/title1.html",
params->client.get());
return true;
}
// Not handled by us.
return false;
}));
// Navigate to a URL with with COOP and OriginAgentCluster headers, embedding
// two iframes at a.foo.com and b.foo.com.
GURL coop_oac_url(
"https://foo.com/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?"
"foo.com(a.foo.com,b.foo.com)");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_oac_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOrigin);
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child1 = root->child_at(0);
FrameTreeNode* child2 = root->child_at(1);
// The two subframes should end up in the same SiteInstance, different from
// the main frame's SiteInstance. Both SiteInstances should be in a process
// dedicated to foo.com, but the main frame's process should be for
// origin-keyed foo.com (strictly foo.com excluding subdomains) due to
// Origin-Agent-Cluster, whereas the subframe process should be for
// site-keyed foo.com.
SiteInstanceImpl* main_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
SiteInstanceImpl* child_instance =
child1->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(child_instance, child2->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance());
EXPECT_NE(child_instance, main_instance);
EXPECT_TRUE(main_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(main_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_EQ(main_instance->GetSiteInfo().site_url(),
child_instance->GetSiteInfo().site_url());
EXPECT_EQ(main_instance->GetSiteInfo().process_lock_url(),
child_instance->GetSiteInfo().process_lock_url());
auto main_lock = main_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
auto child_lock = child_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
EXPECT_TRUE(main_lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_TRUE(main_lock.is_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_lock.is_origin_keyed_process());
auto foo_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com"));
EXPECT_TRUE(main_lock.MatchesOrigin(foo_origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(child_lock.MatchesOrigin(foo_origin));
}
// Check that when a site triggers both COOP isolation and OriginAgentCluster,
// both mechanisms take effect. Similar to the test above, but starts on a URL
// where the origin doesn't match the site.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest,
COOPAndOriginAgentClusterOnSubdomain) {
// Navigate to a URL with with COOP and OriginAgentCluster headers.
GURL coop_oac_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"oac.coop.com",
"/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin&"
"Origin-Agent-Cluster: ?1");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_oac_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOrigin);
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
// Add a subframe and navigate to foo.coop.com.
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell(),
"var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');"
"iframe.id = 'child';"
"document.body.appendChild(iframe);"));
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
GURL child_url(https_server()->GetURL("foo.coop.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "child", child_url));
// The subframe should end up in a different SiteInstance from the main
// frame's SiteInstance. The main frame's SiteInstance should be in an
// origin-keyed process locked to oac.foo.com, whereas the child's
// SiteInstance should be in a site-keyed process locked to foo.com.
SiteInstanceImpl* main_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
SiteInstanceImpl* child_instance =
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_NE(child_instance, main_instance);
EXPECT_TRUE(main_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_TRUE(main_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_instance->GetSiteInfo().requires_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_NE(main_instance->GetSiteInfo().site_url(),
child_instance->GetSiteInfo().site_url());
EXPECT_NE(main_instance->GetSiteInfo().process_lock_url(),
child_instance->GetSiteInfo().process_lock_url());
auto main_lock = main_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
auto child_lock = child_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
EXPECT_TRUE(main_lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_TRUE(child_lock.is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_TRUE(main_lock.is_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(child_lock.is_origin_keyed_process());
auto oac_coop_origin = url::Origin::Create(coop_oac_url);
auto coop_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://coop.com"));
EXPECT_TRUE(main_lock.MatchesOrigin(oac_coop_origin));
EXPECT_TRUE(child_lock.MatchesOrigin(coop_origin));
}
// Verify that if strict site isolation is in place, COOP isolation does not
// add redundant isolated origins to ChildProcessSecurityPolicy.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, SiteAlreadyRequiresDedicatedProcess) {
// Enable --site-per-process and navigate to a COOP-enabled document.
IsolateAllSitesForTesting(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess());
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"coop.com", "/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
// Simulate user activation, which normally triggers COOP isolation for
// future BrowsingInstances.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell(), "// no-op"));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOrigin);
SiteInstanceImpl* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
// The SiteInstance should require a dedicated process, but
// ChildProcessSecurityPolicy shouldn't have added an isolated origin
// for coop.com.
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
auto origins = policy->GetIsolatedOrigins(
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::IsolatedOriginSource::WEB_TRIGGERED);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, origins.size());
EXPECT_FALSE(policy->IsIsolatedOrigin(coop_instance->GetIsolationContext(),
url::Origin::Create(coop_url),
false /* origin_requests_isolation */));
}
// Verify that seeing a user activation on a COOP document triggers isolation
// of that document's site in future BrowsingInstances, but doesn't affect any
// existing BrowsingInstances.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, UserActivation) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"b.com", "/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOrigin);
FrameTreeNode* coop_root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
SiteInstance* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
// The b.com COOP page should trigger the isolation heuristic and require a
// dedicated process locked to b.com.
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// At this point, the COOP page shouldn't have user activation.
EXPECT_FALSE(coop_root->HasTransientUserActivation());
// Create a new window, forcing a new BrowsingInstance, and check that b.com
// is *not* isolated in it. Since b.com in `coop_instance`'s
// BrowsingInstance hasn't been interacted with, the COOP isolation does not
// apply to other BrowsingInstances yet.
Shell* shell2 = CreateBrowser();
GURL no_coop_b_url = https_server()->GetURL("b.com", "/title2.html");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell2, no_coop_b_url));
FrameTreeNode* shell2_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell2->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> instance2 =
shell2->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(instance2->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// Simulate a user activation in the original COOP page by running a dummy
// script (ExecJs sends user activation by default).
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(coop_root, "// no-op"));
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_root->HasTransientUserActivation());
// Create a third window in a new BrowsingInstance and navigate it to a
// non-COOP b.com URL. The above user activation should've forced COOP
// isolation for b.com to apply to future BrowsingInstances, so check that
// this navigation ends up requiring a dedicated process.
Shell* shell3 = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell3, no_coop_b_url));
SiteInstance* instance3 =
shell3->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(instance3->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_FALSE(instance2->IsRelatedSiteInstance(instance3));
EXPECT_FALSE(coop_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(instance3));
// Ensure that the older BrowsingInstance in the second window wasn't
// affected by the new isolation. Adding a b.com subframe or popup should
// stay in the same SiteInstance. Navigating the popup out from and back to
// b.com should also end up on the same SiteInstance.
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell2,
"var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');"
"iframe.id = 'child';"
"document.body.appendChild(iframe);",
EXECUTE_SCRIPT_NO_USER_GESTURE));
FrameTreeNode* child = shell2_root->child_at(0);
GURL another_b_url(https_server()->GetURL("b.com", "/title3.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
NavigateIframeToURL(shell2->web_contents(), "child", another_b_url));
SiteInstanceImpl* child_instance =
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_EQ(child_instance, instance2);
Shell* popup = OpenPopup(shell2, another_b_url, "");
FrameTreeNode* popup_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(popup->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
EXPECT_EQ(popup_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(), instance2);
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(
popup, https_server()->GetURL("c.com", "/title1.html")));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(popup, another_b_url));
EXPECT_EQ(popup_root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(), instance2);
// Close the popup.
popup->Close();
// Without any related windows, navigating to b.com in the second window's
// main frame should trigger a proactive BrowsingInstance swap (see
// ShouldSwapBrowsingInstancesForDynamicIsolation()), since we notice that
// b.com would be isolated in a fresh BrowsingInstance, and nothing prevents
// the BrowsingInstance swap. Hence, in that case, the navigation should be
// in a new BrowsingInstance and in an isolated process.
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURLFromRenderer(
shell2, https_server()->GetURL("b.com", "/title3.html")));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> instance2_new =
shell2->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(instance2_new->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
EXPECT_NE(instance2_new, instance2);
EXPECT_FALSE(instance2_new->IsRelatedSiteInstance(instance2.get()));
}
// Similar to the test above, but verify that a user activation on a same-site
// subframe also triggers isolation of a COOP site in the main frame for future
// BrowsingInstances.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, UserActivationInSubframe) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"b.com", "/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOrigin);
SiteInstance* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// Add a cross-site subframe.
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell(),
"var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');"
"iframe.id = 'child';"
"document.body.appendChild(iframe);",
EXECUTE_SCRIPT_NO_USER_GESTURE));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
GURL c_url(https_server()->GetURL("c.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "child", c_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(root->HasTransientUserActivation());
EXPECT_FALSE(child->HasTransientUserActivation());
// Simulate a user activation in the subframe by running a dummy script.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(child, "// no-op"));
EXPECT_TRUE(child->HasTransientUserActivation());
// Since the iframe is cross-origin, it shouldn't trigger isolation of b.com
// for future BrowsingInstances.
GURL no_coop_b_url = https_server()->GetURL("b.com", "/title2.html");
{
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, no_coop_b_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> instance =
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
}
// Now, make the iframe same-origin and simulate a user gesture.
GURL b_url(https_server()->GetURL("b.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateIframeToURL(web_contents(), "child", b_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(child, "// no-op"));
// Ensure that b.com is now isolated in a new tab and BrowsingInstance.
{
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, no_coop_b_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> instance =
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
}
}
// Similar to the test above, but verify that a user activation on a
// same-origin about:blank subframe triggers isolation of a COOP site in the
// main frame for future BrowsingInstances.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, UserActivationInAboutBlankSubframe) {
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"b.com", "/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOrigin);
SiteInstance* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
// Add a cross-site blank subframe.
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecJs(shell(),
"var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');"
"iframe.id = 'child';"
"document.body.appendChild(iframe);",
EXECUTE_SCRIPT_NO_USER_GESTURE));
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_FALSE(root->HasTransientUserActivation());
EXPECT_FALSE(child->HasTransientUserActivation());
// Simulate a user activation in the subframe by running a dummy script.
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecJs(child, "// no-op"));
EXPECT_TRUE(child->HasTransientUserActivation());
// Ensure that b.com is isolated in a new tab and BrowsingInstance.
{
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
GURL no_coop_b_url = https_server()->GetURL("b.com", "/title2.html");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, no_coop_b_url));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> instance =
new_shell->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
}
}
// Ensure that navigating to http://localhost which has COOP+COEP headers, and
// hence will attempt to trigger COOP isolation, will not crash. See
// https://crbug.com/1276155.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(COOPIsolationTest, Localhost) {
// Navigate to a URL with COOP + COEP on http://localhost.
GURL coop_url = https_server()->GetURL(
"localhost",
"/set-header?Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin&"
"Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), coop_url));
EXPECT_EQ(
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->cross_origin_opener_policy().value,
network::mojom::CrossOriginOpenerPolicyValue::kSameOriginPlusCoep);
// http://localhost isn't currently considered a valid isolated origin (since
// it won't work for subdomain matching), so the navigation should not
// trigger site isolation. Note, however, that the process lock should still
// reflect COOP+COEP isolation.
SiteInstanceImpl* coop_instance =
web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance();
EXPECT_FALSE(coop_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
auto lock = coop_instance->GetProcess()->GetProcessLock();
EXPECT_TRUE(lock.GetWebExposedIsolationInfo().is_isolated());
EXPECT_FALSE(lock.is_locked_to_site());
}
// Helper class for testing site isolation triggered by different JIT policies
// being applied.
class JITIsolationTest : public IsolatedOriginTest,
public ::testing::WithParamInterface<bool> {
public:
JITIsolationTest() = default;
~JITIsolationTest() override = default;
// A custom ContentBrowserTestContentBrowserClient to selectively turn off JIT
// for certain sites.
class JitContentBrowserClient
: public ContentBrowserTestContentBrowserClient {
public:
JitContentBrowserClient(bool jit_disabled_default,
bool disable_site_isolation_entirely)
: is_jit_disabled_by_default_(jit_disabled_default),
is_site_isolation_disabled_entirely_(
disable_site_isolation_entirely) {}
bool IsJitDisabledForSite(BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& site_url) override {
if (site_url.is_empty()) {
return is_jit_disabled_by_default_;
}
if (site_url.DomainIs("jit-disabled.com")) {
return true;
}
if (site_url.DomainIs("jit-enabled.com")) {
return false;
}
return is_jit_disabled_by_default_;
}
bool ShouldEnableStrictSiteIsolation() override {
return !is_site_isolation_disabled_entirely_;
}
private:
bool is_jit_disabled_by_default_;
bool is_site_isolation_disabled_entirely_;
};
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_P(JITIsolationTest, MainFrameTest) {
bool jit_disabled_by_default = GetParam();
JitContentBrowserClient policy(jit_disabled_by_default,
/* disable_site_isolation_entirely */ false);
// Navigate to jit-disabled.com which should always have JIT disabled.
GURL disabled_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.jit-disabled.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), disabled_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(shell()
->web_contents()
->GetPrimaryMainFrame()
->GetProcess()
->IsJitDisabled());
// Navigate to jit-enabled.com which should always have JIT enabled.
GURL enabled_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.jit-enabled.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), enabled_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(shell()
->web_contents()
->GetPrimaryMainFrame()
->GetProcess()
->IsJitDisabled());
// Navigate to a site with no policy and it should match the default.
GURL default_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), default_url));
EXPECT_EQ(jit_disabled_by_default, shell()
->web_contents()
->GetPrimaryMainFrame()
->GetProcess()
->IsJitDisabled());
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_P(JITIsolationTest, DefaultSiteTest) {
// Skip the test if --site-per-process is used on the command line, as the
// test needs to run without strict site isolation (see
// JitContentBrowserClient below).
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting())
return;
bool jit_disabled_by_default = GetParam();
JitContentBrowserClient policy(jit_disabled_by_default,
/* disable_site_isolation_entirely */ true);
// All three sites should have JIT enabled or disabled together, if site
// isolation is disabled, since they are all put into the default
// SiteInstance.
GURL disabled_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.jit-disabled.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), disabled_url));
EXPECT_EQ(jit_disabled_by_default, shell()
->web_contents()
->GetPrimaryMainFrame()
->GetProcess()
->IsJitDisabled());
GURL enabled_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.jit-enabled.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), enabled_url));
EXPECT_EQ(jit_disabled_by_default, shell()
->web_contents()
->GetPrimaryMainFrame()
->GetProcess()
->IsJitDisabled());
GURL default_url(
embedded_test_server()->GetURL("www.foo.com", "/title1.html"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), default_url));
EXPECT_EQ(jit_disabled_by_default, shell()
->web_contents()
->GetPrimaryMainFrame()
->GetProcess()
->IsJitDisabled());
}
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(JITEnabledByDefault,
JITIsolationTest,
::testing::Values(false));
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(JITDisabledByDefault,
JITIsolationTest,
::testing::Values(true));
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(JITIsolationTest, SubFrameTest) {
// Set JIT to be enabled by default.
JitContentBrowserClient policy(
/* jit_disabled_default */ false,
/* disable_site_isolation_entirely */ false);
GURL default_embeds_disabled(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(jit-disabled.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), default_embeds_disabled));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(shell()->web_contents()).size());
// Top frame 'foo.com' should have JIT enabled as that's the default.
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
EXPECT_FALSE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->IsJitDisabled());
// The frame containing jit-disabled.com should have JIT disabled.
FrameTreeNode* child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->IsJitDisabled());
// And the other way round, where jit-disabled.com embeds foo.com.
GURL disabled_embeds_default(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"jit-disabled.com",
"/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?jit-disabled.com(foo.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), disabled_embeds_default));
EXPECT_EQ(2u, CollectAllRenderFrameHosts(
shell()->web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame())
.size());
// Top frame 'jit-disabled.com' should have JIT disabled.
root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
EXPECT_TRUE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->IsJitDisabled());
// The frame containing foo.com should have JIT enabled as that's the default.
child_frame_node = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_FALSE(
child_frame_node->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->IsJitDisabled());
}
// Check that jitless subframes obey process reuse policies.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(JITIsolationTest, SubFrameProcessReuse) {
// Set JIT to be enabled by default.
JitContentBrowserClient policy(
/* jit_disabled_default */ false,
/* disable_site_isolation_entirely */ false);
GURL default_embeds_disabled(embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
"foo.com", "/cross_site_iframe_factory.html?foo.com(jit-disabled.com)"));
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), default_embeds_disabled));
// Top frame 'foo.com' should have JIT enabled as that's the default.
FrameTreeNode* root = web_contents()->GetPrimaryFrameTree().root();
EXPECT_FALSE(root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->IsJitDisabled());
// The frame containing jit-disabled.com should have JIT disabled.
FrameTreeNode* child = root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->IsJitDisabled());
// Create a new window, unrelated to the current one, and set up the same
// frame hierarchy.
Shell* new_shell = CreateBrowser();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(new_shell, default_embeds_disabled));
FrameTreeNode* new_root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(new_shell->web_contents())
->GetPrimaryFrameTree()
.root();
EXPECT_FALSE(new_root->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->IsJitDisabled());
FrameTreeNode* new_child = new_root->child_at(0);
EXPECT_TRUE(new_child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess()->IsJitDisabled());
// The subframes should be in separate BrowsingInstances, but because they
// have the same site, they should share the same process.
EXPECT_FALSE(
new_child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()->IsRelatedSiteInstance(
child->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance()));
EXPECT_EQ(new_child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess(),
child->current_frame_host()->GetProcess());
}
} // namespace content
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