
On Windows some processes are not CET compatible but most are. This adds a CetCompatible method to the sandbox delegate to indicate CET compatibility. Before this CL the renderer was special cased, but is now controlled by a delegate. CET remains disabled for the renderer. This CL also adds to the NaCl delegate to return false as NaClSyscallCSegHook swaps stacks in a non-compliant manner. This is new behavior but should (partly) fix 1173919. This change should only affect Windows 20H1 or later running on Intel 11th gen CPUs. Tests: browser_tests (including NaCl*) on supporting hardware Bug: 1173919 Change-Id: Ib4d7384c81c21d605bcad47e45a6021995c04a5f Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2674433 Commit-Queue: Alex Gough <ajgo@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Will Harris <wfh@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#851401}
Sandbox Library
This directory contains platform-specific sandboxing libraries. Sandboxing is a technique that can improve the security of an application by separating untrustworthy code (or code that handles untrustworthy data) and restricting its privileges and capabilities.
Each platform relies on the operating system's process primitive to isolate code into distinct security principals, and platform-specific technologies are used to implement the privilege reduction. At a high-level:
mac/
uses the Seatbelt sandbox. See the detailed design for more.linux/
uses namespaces and Seccomp-BPF. See the detailed design for more.win/
uses a combination of restricted tokens, distinct job objects, alternate desktops, and integrity levels. See the detailed design for more.
Built on top of the low-level sandboxing library is the
//sandbox/policy
component, which provides concrete
policies and helper utilities for sandboxing specific Chromium processes and
services. The core sandbox library cannot depend on the policy component.