
URLs which are secure contexts can use the origin isolation feature, even if they're not HTTPS. The most important example of this is http://localhost. Fixed: 1142894 Change-Id: I0c8d1c73465c2c289ae2996695f0c42f78cf100c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2503849 Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Domenic Denicola <domenic@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#822168}
167 lines
5.7 KiB
C++
167 lines
5.7 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2017 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
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// found in the LICENSE file.
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#include <string>
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#include "content/browser/isolated_origin_util.h"
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#include "base/logging.h"
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#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
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#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
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#include "services/network/public/cpp/is_potentially_trustworthy.h"
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#include "url/gurl.h"
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const char* kAllSubdomainsWildcard = "[*.]";
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namespace content {
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IsolatedOriginPattern::IsolatedOriginPattern(base::StringPiece pattern)
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: isolate_all_subdomains_(false), is_valid_(false) {
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Parse(pattern);
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}
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IsolatedOriginPattern::IsolatedOriginPattern(const url::Origin& origin)
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: IsolatedOriginPattern(origin.GetURL().spec()) {}
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IsolatedOriginPattern::~IsolatedOriginPattern() = default;
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IsolatedOriginPattern::IsolatedOriginPattern(
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const IsolatedOriginPattern& other) = default;
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IsolatedOriginPattern& IsolatedOriginPattern::operator=(
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const IsolatedOriginPattern& other) = default;
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IsolatedOriginPattern::IsolatedOriginPattern(IsolatedOriginPattern&& other) =
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default;
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IsolatedOriginPattern& IsolatedOriginPattern::operator=(
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IsolatedOriginPattern&& other) = default;
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bool IsolatedOriginPattern::Parse(const base::StringPiece& unparsed_pattern) {
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pattern_ = unparsed_pattern.as_string();
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origin_ = url::Origin();
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isolate_all_subdomains_ = false;
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is_valid_ = false;
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size_t host_begin = unparsed_pattern.find(url::kStandardSchemeSeparator);
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if (host_begin == base::StringPiece::npos || host_begin == 0)
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return false;
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// Skip over the scheme separator.
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host_begin += strlen(url::kStandardSchemeSeparator);
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if (host_begin >= unparsed_pattern.size())
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return false;
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base::StringPiece scheme_part = unparsed_pattern.substr(0, host_begin);
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base::StringPiece host_part = unparsed_pattern.substr(host_begin);
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// Empty schemes or hosts are invalid for isolation purposes.
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if (host_part.size() == 0)
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return false;
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if (base::StartsWith(host_part, kAllSubdomainsWildcard)) {
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isolate_all_subdomains_ = true;
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host_part.remove_prefix(strlen(kAllSubdomainsWildcard));
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}
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GURL conformant_url(base::JoinString({scheme_part, host_part}, ""));
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origin_ = url::Origin::Create(conformant_url);
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// Ports are ignored when matching isolated origins (see also
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// https://crbug.com/914511).
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const std::string& scheme = origin_.scheme();
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int default_port = url::DefaultPortForScheme(scheme.data(), scheme.length());
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if (origin_.port() != default_port) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Ignoring port number in isolated origin: " << origin_;
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origin_ = url::Origin::Create(GURL(
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origin_.scheme() + url::kStandardSchemeSeparator + origin_.host()));
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}
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// Can't isolate subdomains of an IP address, must be a valid isolated origin
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// after processing.
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if ((conformant_url.HostIsIPAddress() && isolate_all_subdomains_) ||
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!IsolatedOriginUtil::IsValidIsolatedOrigin(origin_)) {
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origin_ = url::Origin();
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isolate_all_subdomains_ = false;
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return false;
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}
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DCHECK(!is_valid_ || !origin_.opaque());
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is_valid_ = true;
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return true;
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}
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// static
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bool IsolatedOriginUtil::DoesOriginMatchIsolatedOrigin(
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const url::Origin& origin,
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const url::Origin& isolated_origin) {
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// Don't match subdomains if the isolated origin is an IP address.
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if (isolated_origin.GetURL().HostIsIPAddress())
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return origin == isolated_origin;
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// Compare scheme and hostname, but don't compare ports - see
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// https://crbug.com/914511.
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if (origin.scheme() != isolated_origin.scheme())
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return false;
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// Subdomains of an isolated origin are considered to be in the same isolated
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// origin.
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return origin.DomainIs(isolated_origin.host());
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}
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// static
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bool IsolatedOriginUtil::IsValidIsolatedOrigin(const url::Origin& origin) {
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return IsValidIsolatedOriginImpl(origin, true);
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}
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// static
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bool IsolatedOriginUtil::IsValidOriginForOptInIsolation(
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const url::Origin& origin) {
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// Per https://html.spec.whatwg.org/C/#initialise-the-document-object,
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// non-secure contexts cannot be isolated via opt-in origin isolation.
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return IsValidIsolatedOriginImpl(origin, false) &&
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network::IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(origin);
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}
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// static
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bool IsolatedOriginUtil::IsValidIsolatedOriginImpl(
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const url::Origin& origin,
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bool check_has_registry_domain) {
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if (origin.opaque())
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return false;
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// Isolated origins should have HTTP or HTTPS schemes. Hosts in other
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// schemes may not be compatible with subdomain matching.
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GURL origin_gurl = origin.GetURL();
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if (!origin_gurl.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS())
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return false;
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// IP addresses are allowed.
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if (origin_gurl.HostIsIPAddress())
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return true;
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// Disallow hosts such as http://co.uk/, which don't have a valid
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// registry-controlled domain. This prevents subdomain matching from
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// grouping unrelated sites on a registry into the same origin.
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//
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// This is not relevant for opt-in origin isolation, which doesn't need to
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// match subdomains. (And it'd be bad to check this in that case, as it
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// prohibits http://localhost/; see https://crbug.com/1142894.)
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if (check_has_registry_domain) {
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const bool has_registry_domain =
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net::registry_controlled_domains::HostHasRegistryControlledDomain(
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origin.host(),
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net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
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net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
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if (!has_registry_domain)
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return false;
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}
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// For now, disallow hosts with a trailing dot.
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// TODO(alexmos): Enabling this would require carefully thinking about
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// whether hosts without a trailing dot should match it.
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if (origin.host().back() == '.')
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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} // namespace content
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