88ba2ce076
Split from: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/6004959/21 Generated patch --------------- - Tool: ./tool/clang/spanify/rewrite-multiple-platform.sh - Platform: Linux. - Filter: This includes 2400/4222 patches. I included the std::array ones and excluded build errors. Google announcement: -------------------- https://groups.google.com/a/google.com/g/chrome-memory-safety/c/RMiO4gaVLQA/m/Yz-3NCObAgAJ Benchmarks: ---------- See design doc and https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/6004959/21 Description ----------- The consensus during the memory safety summit was to begin rewriting relevant C-style arrays to C++11 std::array. It can be done immediately, offers better developer ergonomics, and fix large chunks of the -Wunsafe-buffer-usage errors in Chrome. To clarify, this effort is complementary to the longer plan work with enabling -fsanitize=array-bounds, and we plan to leverage both, especially for protecting 3p code. [Attached] is a document detailing the rationale, benefits, and considerations for potential compile-time and performance impacts. [Attached]:https://docs.google.com/document/d/1z5aBDg26lHmNDjXRCysElWKx7E4PAJXqykI_k7ondJI/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.cqgo7wvp0kzt NO_IFTTT=No need to update base/debug/stack_trace.h Bug: 378069401 Change-Id: I5d2420ca9261f62a8a21f037ecd1850ecdb58210 R: dcheng@chromium.org AX-Relnotes: n/a. Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/6039266 Auto-Submit: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org> Owners-Override: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#1396391}
Sandbox Library
This directory contains platform-specific sandboxing libraries. Sandboxing is a technique that can improve the security of an application by separating untrustworthy code (or code that handles untrustworthy data) and restricting its privileges and capabilities.
Each platform relies on the operating system's process primitive to isolate code into distinct security principals, and platform-specific technologies are used to implement the privilege reduction. At a high-level:
mac/uses the Seatbelt sandbox. See the detailed design for more.linux/uses namespaces and Seccomp-BPF. See the detailed design for more.win/uses a combination of restricted tokens, distinct job objects, alternate desktops, and integrity levels. See the detailed design for more.
Built on top of the low-level sandboxing library is the
//sandbox/policy component, which provides concrete
policies and helper utilities for sandboxing specific Chromium processes and
services. The core sandbox library cannot depend on the policy component.